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THE HACKER’S AEGIS 
Derek E. Bambauer* 
Oliver Day∗∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Intellectual property (IP) law stifles critical research on software security 
vulnerabilities, placing computer users at risk.  Researchers who discover 
flaws often face IP-based legal threats if they reveal findings to anyone other 
than the software vendor.  This Article argues that the interplay between law 
and vulnerability data challenges existing scholarship on how intellectual 
property law should regulate information about improvements on protected 
works, and suggests weakening, not enhancing, IP protections where 
infringement is difficult to detect, lucrative, and creates significant negative 
externalities.  It proposes a set of three reforms—“patches,” in software 
terms—to protect security research.  Legal reform would create immunity from 
civil IP liability for researchers who follow “responsible disclosure” rules.  
Linguistic reform would seek to make the term hacker less threatening either 
by recapturing the term’s original meaning, or abandoning it.  Finally, 
structural reform would ameliorate failures in the market for software 
vulnerability data by having a trusted third party act as a voluntary 
clearinghouse.  The Article concludes by describing other areas, such as 
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INTRODUCTION: != BULLETPROOF1 
Mike Lynn had done the impossible.  He had found a way to crack open the 
operating system on Cisco internet routers, causing them to run his code.2  
Routers were Cisco’s most important product—and the backbone of much of 
the internet—precisely because they had been legendarily immune to such 
attacks.3  Lynn, though, had discovered their Achilles’ heel.  The routers’ 
vulnerability placed a wide swath of internet infrastructure at risk. 
Lynn, an experienced security researcher with the firm Internet Security 
Systems (ISS), followed the protocol of “white hat” hackers, who probe for 
computer software and hardware flaws with the goal of discovering, not 
exploiting, them.4  He reported his findings to Cisco, which dutifully issued a 
patch to correct the bug.5  But Cisco—concerned with damaging the invincible 
image of its products—refused to draw particular attention to the patch, or to 
press customers to implement it.6  Lynn, worried by Cisco’s decision not to 
publicize the fix, prepared to give a presentation at the Black Hat hacker 
conference in Las Vegas that would detail the basic concepts of the bug, but 
would withhold information about how to exploit it.7 
Cisco objected, fervently.  Employing a range of legal theories from 
intellectual property law, the company convinced a federal judge to issue a 
restraining order preventing Lynn from giving his presentation.8  The company 
also forced conference organizers to rip the printed version of Lynn’s slides 
 
 1 In programming languages, != means “not equal to.”  See Built-In Types—Python v2.7.1 
Documentation, PYTHON STANDARD LIBR. § 5.3 tbl., http://docs.python.org/library/stdtypes.html#comparisons 
(last updated May 13, 2011). 
 2 Kim Zetter, Router Flaw Is a Ticking Bomb, WIRED (Aug. 1, 2005), http://www.wired.com/politics/ 
security/news/2005/08/68365. 
 3 Robert Lemos, Cisco, ISS File Suit Against Rogue Researcher, SECURITYFOCUS (July 27, 2005), http:// 
www.securityfocus.com/news/11259. 
 4 By convention, black hat hackers discover bugs for financial gain or malicious reasons, and gray hat 
hackers behave either as white hats or black hats, depending on the circumstances.  The tripartite division, 
borrowed from movie Westerns, corresponds roughly to good actors (white hats), bad ones (black hats), and 
those whose orientation varies (gray hats).  See THOMAS WILHELM, PROFESSIONAL PENETRATION TESTING: 
CREATING AND OPERATING A FORMAL HACKING LAB 13–18 (2009). 
 5 Robert McMillan, Black Hat: ISS Researcher Quits Job to Detail Cisco Flaws, INFOWORLD (July 27, 
2005), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/black-hat-iss-researcher-quits-job-detail-cisco-flaws-088. 
 6 See Zetter, supra note 2. 
 7 Jennifer Granick, An Insider’s View of ‘Ciscogate,’ WIRED (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.wired.com/ 
science/discoveries/news/2005/08/68435. 
 8 Id. 
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out of the conference materials, and to turn over CDs containing a copy of his 
slideshow.9 
This Article argues that conflicts such as the one between Lynn and Cisco 
are both increasingly common and socially harmful.  Intellectual property (IP) 
law stifles the dissemination of critical research on software security 
vulnerabilities.  We argue that IP law’s incentive effects are superfluous for 
these bugs, as security research is an exemplar of “peer production” as 
conceptualized by Yochai Benkler,10 Eric von Hippel,11 and Eric S. 
Raymond.12  Researchers hunt bugs for a variety of reasons: intellectual 
curiosity, ideology, reputation, and occasionally remuneration.  For 
vulnerability research, IP law plays a suppressive rather than a generative 
function—it blocks or limits whether, and how, hackers share their findings.13  
The suppressive effect is heightened by the fact that researchers can rarely, if 
ever, obtain IP law protection for their findings or insights.  We argue that, 
much as researchers have hacked software to make it behave unexpectedly and 
thereby serve their purposes, software vendors have hacked IP law, using it for 
ends unrelated to its original purpose. 
Critically, IP law—like the software it protects—malfunctions here.  It 
enables software firms to suppress information about flaws.  It presses 
researchers to avoid legal risks from public disclosure and to gain financially 
by offering their findings on the black market rather than through legitimate 
channels.  Software-vulnerability research challenges standard intellectual 
property scholarship on the regulation of information about improving a 
protected work or invention.  Under current doctrine, someone who possesses 
information about how to improve a work or invention protected by IP has 
three options: bargain with the IP owner, seek an improvement patent, or 
infringe.  Contemporary scholarship typically focuses on tuning patent and 
copyright law to generate optimal incentives and to coordinate improvements.  
Mark A. Lemley argues that it is unnecessary for inventors to capture the full 
 
 9 Bruce Schneier, Cisco Harasses Security Researcher, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (July 29, 2005, 4:35 
AM), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/cisco_harasses.html. 
 10 Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 375 
(2002). 
 11 ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 93–97 (2005) [hereinafter VON HIPPEL, 
DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION]; ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 25–26 (1988) [hereinafter 
VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION]. 
 12 ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 49–53 (Tim O’Reilly ed., rev. ed. 2001). 
 13 See generally Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006) 
(describing how the internet’s architecture empowers users to generate innovation). 
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social value of their advances, and that patent law should not set this 
internalization as a goal.14  Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson analyze 
the incentive effects of various standards for setting the scope of a patent,15 as 
does Edmund W. Kitch.16  William M. Landes and Judge Richard A. Posner 
justify control over improvement information by IP owners as useful in 
reducing transaction costs.17  Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg 
worry about the problem of holdout costs when multiple parties must bargain 
over improvements.18  Paul Goldstein assesses how copyright’s derivative 
works doctrine—particularly indifferent to economics—has created adverse 
effects on incentives to invest in copyrighted works.19  Current scholarly 
wisdom thus presses toward conferring control over improvement information 
to IP owners. 
This Article, in contrast, identifies software security research as a 
counterexample, where IP owners’ strong controls over improvement 
information are harmful.  Security bugs are problematic for three reasons: 
infringement is (1) difficult to detect, (2) socially harmful due to negative 
externalities, and (3) lucrative.  We argue that IP law should be alert to similar 
situations and that, counterintuitively, such circumstances require a diminution, 
not an increase, in IP protections.  The Article goes on to suggest additional 
areas where the channeling effect of legal rules over improvement information 
may be critically important. 
This Article is also the first to propose a set of reforms—“patches,” in 
software terms—to protect socially valuable security research, guide behavior 
of those searching for vulnerabilities, and channel dissemination of 
vulnerability data toward legitimate consumers.  Other legal scholarship treats 
intellectual property law as a lost cause.  Jennifer Stisa Granick argues 
compellingly against restrictions on vulnerability disclosures, but focuses on IP 
 
 14 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005). 
 15 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 839 (1990). 
 16 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
 17 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 110–11 (2003). 
 18 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 640–41, 667–77 (1998); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700 (1998). 
 19 Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
209 (1983). 
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law solely as a barrier.20  Peter P. Swire, in assessing incentives for 
vulnerability disclosure, notes law’s role as a barrier to a firm’s competitors in 
creating equivalent software.21  Susan W. Brenner evaluates the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a form of information censorship.22  
Bruce H. Kobayashi argues for more extensive intellectual property protection 
to drive adoption of cybersecurity.23 
Computer scientists are even more pessimistic.  Stephen Bono, Aviel 
Rubin, Adam Stubblefield, and Matthew Green refer to “security through 
legality” as a “hopelessly flawed methodology.”24  Tom Cross views efforts to 
limit hackers’ investigations as embracing the view that “ignorance makes you 
safer.”25  And Paul Graham, who invented Bayesian spam filtering, views 
copyright as “a threat to the intellectual freedom [hackers] need to do their 
job,” which is to reduce the creation and impact of poorly written software 
code.26 
In contrast, this Article seeks to adapt IP law, rather than to abandon it as a 
tool.  It proposes three methods of reform to accomplish this.  First, we argue 
that the security research community should try to shift the largely negative, 
threatening set of connotations associated with the term hacker.  If bug hunters 
cannot reclaim the word’s original meaning, they should cede it and employ an 
alternative. 
Second, a voluntary intermediary—a vulnerability clearinghouse—should 
be established to coordinate contact between vendors and researchers, to 
document identified bugs, and to track their evolution.  The clearinghouse can 
address key structural flaws in the market for vulnerability information that 
impede legitimate transactions and push researchers to sell information 
illicitly. 
 
 20 Jennifer Stisa Granick, The Price of Restricting Vulnerability Publications, INT’L J. COMM. L. & 
POL’Y, Spring 2005, at 1, http://www.ijclp.net/files/ijclp_web-doc_10-cy-2004.pdf. 
 21 Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons: Open Source, 
Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 1366 (2006). 
 22 Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and Data Be 
Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 348–56 (2003). 
 23 Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of the Private and Social Costs of the Provision of 
Cybersecurity and Other Public Security Goods, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 261 (2006). 
 24 Stephen Bono et al., Security Through Legality, COMM. ACM, June 2006, at 41, 42. 
 25 Tom Cross, Academic Freedom and the Hacker Ethic, COMM. ACM, June 2006, at 37, 39. 
 26 PAUL GRAHAM, HACKERS & PAINTERS 51 (2004). 
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Finally, the Article proposes regulating researcher behavior in exchange for 
a shield from IP law.  If hackers follow a prescribed course of conduct during 
their investigations—roughly tracking the “responsible disclosure” model used 
in the security community—they should be granted immunity from civil27 
intellectual property liability for that research. 
The goal of these reforms is to channel disclosures of vulnerability 
information in legitimate directions.  Threats of legal liability may prompt 
researchers to offer their discoveries on the (lucrative) black market or to 
withhold research altogether, rather than risking a lawsuit by contacting a 
vendor or publicizing their findings.  The reforms may spur researchers to 
undertake additional investigations, producing more information about bugs; 
however, any such benefit, while helpful, is secondary to the useful effects on 
information distribution. 
This Article builds on two underlying normative commitments.  First, we 
believe that the proposed slate of changes—the Hacker’s Aegis—holds 
considerable promise for improving the security and reliability of computer 
software.  Hackers, like the open source software community, create public 
goods by developing information about software flaws.  Second, we seek to 
defend, and hopefully to reorient the perception of, software security research 
more generally.  The term hacker, once a cognomen of approval, has become a 
term of criticism and even fear.  This shift misrepresents researchers’ activities 
and the social value they contribute.  By protecting software security research, 
we hope to change perceptions of it. 
Part I of this Article describes the ecosystem in which security researchers 
operate.  Part II catalogs the intellectual property tools available to threaten and 
control hackers, and suggests what doctrinal patches are needed to protect 
security research.  Part III describes the Article’s three proposed reforms to 
mitigate IP’s ill effects in this context.  This Article concludes with 
observations on how its analysis can be applied outside the realm of computer 
software. 
 
 27 For a discussion of criminal IP liability for security research, see infra Part III.E. 
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I. THE SOFTWARE SECURITY ECOSYSTEM 
A. The Stakes 
Finding security bugs matters.  Users face an increasingly hostile internet 
environment—one where malware, viruses, identity theft, phishing, and denial-
of-service attacks are ubiquitous.  In the United States, hackers took control of 
over a million personal computers in the last three months of 2009, adding 
them to the ten million already infected with rogue code.28  Security firm 
Panda Labs tested over twenty-two million computers and found that nearly 
half (48.35%) were infected with malware.29  The consequences of suffering a 
hack or an infection can be significant, as the loss of sensitive personal data 
due to security breaches has become commonplace.  A hack at the University 
of North Carolina School of Medicine exposed the personal data and medical 
information of approximately 160,000 mammography patients.30  The Director 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave up online banking after nearly 
falling for a phishing e-mail that appeared to come from his bank.31  A 
vulnerability in one of Time Warner Cable’s standard cable modem/wi-fi 
router units allowed hackers to change the device’s settings and potentially 
intercept data sent through it.32  Viruses can even spread from infected 
personal computers (PCs) to websites.33  Vulnerabilities in software code 
create the weaknesses that hackers exploit. 
Bugs not only put an individual’s information at risk, they create a threat to 
other internet users as well.  Security flaws present two forms of negative 
externalities.  First, each user whose software is compromised increases the 
risk to her peers.  Computers infected with viruses or malware are often 
 
 28 Ellen Nakashima, China Is World Leader in Hacked Computers, Report Finds, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 
2010, at A3. 
 29 See ANTI-PHISHING WORKING GRP., PHISHING ACTIVITY TRENDS REPORT: 3RD QUARTER 2009, at 10 
(2009), available at http://www.antiphishing.org/reports/apwg_report_Q3_2009.pdf. 
 30 Eric Ferreri, UNC Security Breach Less Severe than Thought, NEWS & OBSERVER CAMPUS NOTES 
BLOG (Sept. 30, 2009, 3:13 PM), http://blogs.newsobserver.com/campusnotes/unc-security-breach-less-severe-
than-thought (discussing exposure of about 160,000 files and 114,000 Social Security numbers); Hackers 
Attack UNC-Based Mammography Database, UNC HEALTH CARE (Sept. 25, 2009), http://news.unchealthcare. 
org/som-vital-signs/archives/vital-signs-sept-25-2009/hackers-attack-unc-based-mammography-database. 
 31 Elinor Mills, Wife Bans FBI Head from Online Banking, CNET INSECURITY COMPLEX (Oct. 7, 2009, 
4:07 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10370164-245.html. 
 32 Kim Zetter, Time Warner Cable Exposes 65,000 Customer Routers to Remote Hacks, WIRED THREAT 
LEVEL (Oct. 20, 2009, 6:20 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/time-warner-cable. 
 33 Maxim Weinstein, Local Malware Causes Infected Websites, STOPBADWARE BLOG (July 16, 2009), 
http://blog.stopbadware.org/2009/07/16/local-malware-causes-infected-websites. 
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aggregated into botnets that are used to send phishing spam, launch denial-of-
service attacks, or distribute malicious code.34  The harm suffered by the 
person with the compromised computer is considerably less than the aggregate 
damage to society and other users.  Second, users face greater harm than 
vendors do, especially overall.35  While precise figures are difficult to 
ascertain, reliable estimates of the worldwide economic damage caused by 
digital attacks in 2003 range from $12.5 billion for worms and viruses, and 
$226 billion for all attacks,36 to $157–$192 billion on Windows PCs alone in 
2004.37  Losses to vendors from security breaches, such as from increased 
support costs, reputational harm, and declines in share price, are also uncertain, 
but likely considerably smaller.38  Vendors, therefore, have less incentive to fix 
bugs than is socially optimal. 
The rise of cloud computing and mobile computing worsens the problem.  
For example, the popular micro-blogging service Twitter suffered a security 
breach when a hacker cracked an employee’s Gmail account, giving him 
access to business documents stored on Google’s Apps service.39  The hacker 
then forwarded confidential company documents to the website TechCrunch, 
which published them.40  He also took over the e-mail accounts of senior 
executives and gained access to Twitter employees’ phone records, personal e-
mail messages, and credit card data.41  Thus, a weakness in a cloud-computing 
application—here, the password-recovery feature of Gmail—caused a cascade 
of harm to multiple users and to their employer.42  Chinese hackers were able 
to penetrate Google’s security to access accounts of human rights activists by 
 
 34 See, e.g., Brett Stone-Gross et al., Your Botnet Is My Botnet: Analysis of a Botnet Takeover, 16 PROC. 
ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 635, 635 (2009). 
 35 See Byung Cho Kim et al., An Economic Analysis of the Software Market with a Risk-Sharing 
Mechanism, INT’L J. ELECTRONIC COM., Winter 2009–2010, at 7, 26–29 (discussing how the security burden 
falls on the consumer because software vendors are not directly liable for losses incurred due to poor security). 
 36 BRIAN CASHELL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32331, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CYBER-
ATTACKS 9 tbl.3, 10 tbl.4 (2004). 
 37 $290 of Malware Damage per Windows PC Worldwide in 2004; XP Service Pack 2 Creates “Haves 
and Have Nots” as Road Forks, MI2G (Aug. 24, 2004, 5:45 PM), http://www.mi2g.com/cgi/mi2g/frameset. 
php?pageid=http://www.mi2g.com/cgi/mi2g/press/240804.php. 
 38 See JOHN VIEGA, THE MYTHS OF SECURITY 142–44 (Mike Loukides ed., 2009). 
 39 Claire Cain Miller & Brad Stone, Twitter Hack Raises Flags on Security, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2009, at 
B1. 
 40 Nik Cubrilovic, The Anatomy of the Twitter Hack, TECHCRUNCH (July 19, 2009), http://www. 
techcrunch.com/2009/07/19/the-anatomy-of-the-twitter-attack. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Miller & Stone, supra note 39. 
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exploiting a security flaw in Microsoft Internet Explorer.43  Similarly, in March 
2009, a flaw in Google Docs briefly exposed private documents to the public, 
causing the Electronic Privacy Information Center to file a complaint with the 
Federal Trade Commission charging Google with a deceptive trade practice.44 
As consumers increasingly store data on, and connect to the internet with, 
smartphones, vulnerabilities in devices such as Apple’s iPhone,45 and operating 
systems such as Google’s Android,46 put sensitive personal information at risk.  
The growing move to use phones for payment systems—whether pay-by-SMS 
or PayPal—makes hacking phones even more attractive.47 
Bugs happen.  Inevitably, software code is imperfect.48  While vendors find 
and fix some flaws, the demands of the release cycle, and the panoply of 
configurations and interactions that software encounters when deployed by 
users, ensure that bugs slip through into production code.  Some of those bugs 
create security weaknesses that can be exploited.  The research firm Gartner 
calculates that 75% of security breaches result from software flaws.49  Even 
large, security-conscious vendors produce vulnerable code.  Oracle faces a new 
automated tool that allows any minimally skilled computer user to break into 
the firm’s database software over the internet.50  In October 2009, Microsoft 
released a record number of fixes for Patch Tuesday—even though its code 
base did not yet include the new operating system Windows 7.51  Adobe 
recently patched a vulnerability in its ubiquitous Acrobat software that allowed 
 
 43 Microsoft Admits Explorer Used in Google China Hack, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
8460819.stm (last updated Jan. 15, 2010); Riva Richmond, Microsoft Plugs Security Hole Used in Attacks on 
Google, N.Y. TIMES BITS (Jan. 21, 2010, 2:24 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/microsoft-plugs-
security-hole-used-in-december-attacks. 
 44 Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other Relief, Google, Inc. and 
Cloud Computing Servs. (F.T.C. Mar. 17, 2009), available at http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ 
ftc031709.pdf. 
 45 Elinor Mills, Researcher Warns of Risks from Rogue iPhone Apps, CNET INSECURITY COMPLEX (Feb. 
3, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10446402-245.html (describing “SpyPhone” app). 
 46 Dean Takahashi, Q&A with Charlie Miller on Hacking the T-Mobile G1 Phone with Google Android 
Software, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 28, 2008), http://venturebeat.com/2008/10/28/qa-with-charlie-miller-on-
hacking-the-t-mobile-g1-phone-with-google-android-software. 
 47 See VIEGA, supra note 38, at 109–11; Daniel Roth, The Future of Money: It’s Flexible, Frictionless, 
and (Almost) Free, WIRED, Mar. 2010, at 70. 
 48 See VIEGA, supra note 38, at 139–44. 
 49 STUART OKIN, COMSEC CONSULTING, MANAGING THE COST OF IT SECURITY 4 (2008), http://www. 
comsecglobal.com/FrameWork/Upload/Managing the cost of IT Security.pdf. 
 50 Jim Finkle, Hacking Oracle’s Database Will Soon Get Easier, REUTERS, July 22, 2009, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/07/22/us-oracle-hackers-idUSTRE56L66D20090722. 
 51 Dan Goodin, Microsoft’s Patch Tuesday Fixes Record Number of Flaws, REGISTER (Oct. 14, 2009, 
12:09 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/14/microsoft_patch_tuesday_oct_2009. 
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hackers to access data on vulnerable computers—nearly a month after the bug 
was first reported and code to exploit it became available.52 
Vulnerabilities surface quickly.  As Eric Raymond famously observed, 
“Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.”53  Some users encounter bugs 
unexpectedly; others know how to look for them.  Hackers are expert in how 
software fails.54  While they lack inside information about the software, there 
are more of them than there are engineers on quality assurance teams even at 
large software firms, and they are highly motivated—by money, by reputation, 
and even by ideology.  In one week in July 2009, for example, outside 
researchers released information about security flaws in the Linux operating 
system kernel,55 the Mozilla Firefox browser,56 and the Bluetooth 
communications protocol.57  The Chromium open source project has 
acknowledged that outside researchers found a number of critical bugs in its 
browser, and Google has begun offering rewards to hackers who find flaws in 
it.58 
Moreover, outsiders have the advantage of time.  A software company’s 
testers must recheck each new version of a program, and they have a limited 
period of time to inspect the final code before it is released to the public.59  
Independent researchers can examine the ultimate version at their leisure.  In 
addition, hackers quickly convert information on security flaws into tools for 
exploiting them.  One comprehensive study of vulnerabilities found that over 
70% of bugs had exploit code available by the time the flaw was publicly 
 
 52 Ryan Naraine, Adobe Confirms PDF Zero-Day Attacks.  Disable JavaScript Now, ZDNET ZERO DAY 
(Dec. 15, 2009, 9:08 AM), http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=5119; Ryan Naraine, Adobe Plugs PDF Zero-
Day Flaw in Latest Security Makeover, ZDNET ZERO DAY (Jan. 13, 2010, 8:06 AM), http://blogs.zdnet.com/ 
security/?p=5234. 
 53 RAYMOND, supra note 12, at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54 See, e.g., Interview: Bruce Schneier, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ 
hackers/interviews/schneier.html (last visited May 13, 2011) (“[Hackers] are the experts in how the systems 
work and how the systems fail.”). 
 55 Dennis Fisher, New Linux Flaw Enables Null Pointer Exploits, THREATPOST (July 17, 2009, 10:45 
AM), http://threatpost.com/en_us/blogs/new-linux-flaw-enables-null-pointer-exploits-071709. 
 56 Ryan Paul, Firefox 3.5.1 Released to Patch TraceMonkey Vulnerability, ARS TECHNICA (July 19, 
2009, 8:35 PM), http://arstechnica.com/open-source/news/2009/07/firefox-351-released-to-patch-tracemonkey 
-vulnerability.ars. 
 57 Sumner Lemon, HTC Issues Hotfix for Bluetooth Vulnerability in Smartphones, TECHWORLD (July 20, 
2009, 8:29 AM), http://www.techworld.com.au/article/311563/htc_issues_hotfix_bluetooth_vulnerability_ 
smartphones. 
 58 Chris Evans, Encouraging More Chromium Security Research, CHROMIUM BLOG (Jan. 28, 2010), 
http://blog.chromium.org/2010/01/encouraging-more-chromium-security.html. 
 59 See JEFF TIAN, SOFTWARE QUALITY ENGINEERING 4–5 (2005). 
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disclosed.60  The incidence of “zero day” bugs—security holes that become 
public before vendors have software patches ready—is rising sharply.61  In 
short, outside researchers will always find flaws that vendors did not catch, and 
some of those bugs will have serious security repercussions. 
This problem for vendors worsens as software becomes more popular and 
more complex.  Operating system (OS) software, for example, is particularly 
subject to flaws.  An OS must expose key aspects of its internal workings to 
the software development community, creating the possibility that a bug in an 
application can wreak havoc on the operating system.62  As more developers 
write applications for the platform, the OS must maintain backwards 
compatibility (ensuring that programs written for its earlier versions work with 
the latest one) and must test an increasing number of software interactions and 
dependencies.  Demands from developers, and the need to ensure that older 
software continues to run properly, can lead OS vendors to tolerate security 
flaws that could be eliminated, but at the cost of sacrificing backwards 
compatibility. 
For example, Microsoft maintained a weak, easily cracked password 
feature (the LAN Manager password hash) in Windows 2000 to avoid breaking 
numerous third-party applications written for earlier versions of Windows.63  
The trade-off for the Redmond company may have been rational: The benefits 
of having additional content running on Windows might outweigh the added 
security risks—to Microsoft—of LAN Manager hacks.  However, for versions 
of the operating system through Windows 2000, LAN Manager was the default 
authentication method in certain circumstances.64  Thus, individuals or 
companies running Windows would be vulnerable unless they actively took 
steps to prevent an attack.65 
 
 60 Stefan Frei et al., Large-Scale Vulnerability Analysis, 2006 PROC. ACM SIGCOMM WORKSHOP ON 
LARGE-SCALE ATTACK DEF. 131, 135. 
 61 Id. (“[T]he number of zero-day exploits is increasing dramatically.”). 
 62 See, e.g., Overview of the Windows API, MICROSOFT DEVELOPER NETWORK, http://msdn.microsoft. 
com/en-us/library/aa383723(VS.85).aspx (last updated Mar. 25, 2010) (“Windows application programming 
interface (API) enables [software developers] to exploit the power of Windows. . . . [and] develop applications 
that run successfully on all versions of Windows . . . .”). 
 63 CHAD TODD, HACK PROOFING WINDOWS 2000 SERVER 395 (2001). 
 64 Id. at 394–400. 
 65 Cf. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 85–89 (2008) (discussing effects of default 
settings). 
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The LAN Manager example highlights a critical puzzle: vendors do not 
always act to fix known weaknesses or, at least, to fix them promptly.66  
Indeed, companies may learn about vulnerabilities at no cost, as when 
independent researchers discover and report bugs.67  Examples abound.  
Juniper Networks barred one of its researchers from giving a talk at the Black 
Hat and Defcon conferences about a vulnerability in Automated Teller 
Machines (ATMs), even though the affected vendor had known of the flaw for 
nine months.68  Apple failed to fix three weaknesses in its iCal scheduling 
software, despite having four months of advance warning from researchers at 
Core Security.69  Sun Microsystems left a vulnerability in its Solaris operating 
system unpatched for over six months, even though it allowed hackers to crash 
the software via a buffer overflow exploit.70 
Bruce Schneier, a security expert, posits two reasons for vendors’ lassitude 
in patching such bugs.71  First, he notes that harms from vulnerabilities affect 
vendors far less than customers.  Bugs create a negative externality.  
Furthermore, if customers cannot discern which component of a system is 
responsible for a problem—for example, detecting whether the flaw was in the 
operating system, the application, or the data—vendors face reduced 
reputational or market pressures to improve security.72  Second, customers tend 
to value new features or faster releases over slower, more limited, but more 
secure, software.  Added features generate more sales than reduced bugs. 
Even if vendors do patch vulnerabilities, they may not call users’ attention 
to the need to install those fixes.73  Despite vendors’ urgings, users cannot 
 
 66 See Ashish Arora et al., Optimal Policy for Software Vulnerability Disclosure, 54 MGMT. SCI. 642 
(2008) (arguing that vendors patch later than is socially optimal). 
 67 See, e.g., Gregg Keizer, Microsoft Patches IE, Admits It Knew of Bug Last August, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Jan. 21, 2010, 2:52 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9147058/Microsoft_patches_IE_admits_it_ 
knew_of_bug_last_August (describing bug reported by Israeli security company). 
 68 Robert McMillan, Juniper Nixes ATM Security Talk, PCWORLD (June 30, 2009, 3:20 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/167648/juniper_nixes_atm_security_talk.html. 
 69 John Leyden, Researchers Out Apple over Unpatched iCal Bugs, REGISTER (May 22, 2008, 5:05 PM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/05/22/unpatched_apple_bug_flap. 
 70 Security Hole in Sun Solaris Left Unpatched for Months, THE H (June 9, 2008, 12:46 PM), 
http://www.h-online.com/newsticker/news/item/Security-hole-in-Sun-Solaris-left-unpatched-for-months-
736215.html. 
 71 Bruce Schneier, The Problem Is Information Insecurity, TECHWATCH TECH BLOG (Aug. 10, 2008), 
http://www.techwatch.co.uk/2008/08/10/the-problem-is-information-insecurity. 
 72 Cf. VIEGA, supra note 38, at 144 (suggesting that vendors derive a greater benefit from allowing 
consumers to discover bugs and notify them, rather than from investing their own capital to perfect the 
system). 
 73 See, e.g., Zetter, supra note 2. 
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always install each new patch.  Large-scale users, especially corporations, have 
limited windows in which they can install patches—typically, they do so 
several times a year to ensure sufficient time to test the stability of those 
changes in their environments.74  Thus, even if a vendor releases a patch, 
customers may not have sufficient information to appreciate the relative 
necessity of applying it immediately—and those who do may be constrained 
from patching by the demands of their computing environment.  Software 
companies may also be reluctant to reveal flaws due to fears that disclosure can 
increase, not decrease, risk.75  Describing a bug—even in the documentation 
available with a patch that remedies it—creates hazards.76  Attackers can use 
the description to reverse engineer the flaw, and then to create code that 
exploits it.  This highlights the challenge that vendors, and researchers 
practicing responsible disclosure, face: if they describe flaws with too much 
precision, hackers can probe the weaknesses, but if they are too general, 
customers will encounter difficulty taking precautions.  Vendors thus prefer to 
keep vulnerabilities secret, believing this best protects them and their 
customers while fixes are readied.77  To improve security, though, software 
companies need not only to fix vulnerabilities, but to inform users so they can 
apply those fixes.78  This is particularly important since black hat hackers—
those who employ vulnerability data to compromise systems for gain—
frequently have access to information about bugs already.79 
It may also make economic sense for vendors to underplay bugs.  Though 
users accept that all software has flaws, a vendor may worry about its 
reputation relative to competitors if it publicizes widely each bug it patches.80  
The concern is strategic behavior: a competing vendor who keeps 
vulnerabilities quiet may enjoy an advantage in perception, even if its 
underlying code is no more secure.  Absent information to detect this strategy, 
 
 74 See Update Management Process, MICROSOFT TECHNET, http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ 
cc700845.aspx (last updated June 1, 2007). 
 75 Cross, supra note 25, at 39–40. 
 76 See, e.g., CHRISTIAN A. CHRISTIANSEN, INT’L DATA CORP., WHAT ENTERPRISES SHOULD KNOW 
ABOUT VENDOR BEST PRACTICES FOR SECURITY PATH ISSUANCE 3 (2008) (on file with authors) (advocating 
“providing just enough information on a vulnerability to help mitigate risk, but not so much information that a 
patch can be reverse engineered”). 
 77 Id. at 2–3 (describing “silent fixing”). 
 78 See Bruce Schneier, The Nonsecurity of Secrecy, COMM. ACM, Oct. 2004, at 120, 120 (“We are all 
less secure if software vendors don’t make their security vulnerabilities public . . . .”). 
 79 CHRISTIANSEN, supra note 76, at 2–3. 
 80 See ORIGINAL SOFTWARE, SOFTWARE QUALITY AND TESTING: A CIO PERSPECTIVE (2008), available 
at http://www.origsoft.com/_assets/client/docs/pdf/whitepapers/cio_software_testing_survey.pdf. 
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users may assume that the number and severity of reported (and even patched) 
bugs correlates with software quality.81  Rational vendors would thus tend to 
report bugs less frequently, and with less dissemination, than would be socially 
optimal. 
The other key aspect of vendors’ decisions is that fixing vulnerabilities is 
costly.  The cost to fix a bug increases as the software development cycle 
progresses; once the code is in production and use—when independent 
researchers typically first get access to it—the cost is greatest.82  One study of 
United Kingdom businesses found that for every dollar spent on software 
development, a company spent seventy-five cents on average to remediate 
security flaws.83  Analysts agree that fixing security bugs is expensive, though 
quantifying those costs with precision is difficult.  Vulnerabilities in web 
applications may cost as little as $400 per flaw to fix, while a cross-platform 
vulnerability in software such as Oracle’s can require over $1 million.84  An 
IDC study found that fixing bugs in applications developed in-house by 
corporations costs from $5 million to $22 million per year, depending on the 
organization’s size.85 
Software code inevitably has weaknesses that internal testing fails to 
discover.  Outsiders find these flaws in time.  Even if they report bugs to the 
vendor, that company may not fix the problems for financial or reputational 
reasons.  This can generate conflicts with outside researchers, whose behavior 
and motivations are explored in the next section. 
B. Bug Hunters 
Independent security researchers are a puzzle: they find bugs for free, even 
when software firms normally pay for this work.  Broadly speaking, there are 
three types of testers: software company employees, consultants, and 
independent researchers.  Employees—generally called Quality Assurance or 
 
 81 See CHRISTIANSEN, supra note 76, at 2. 
 82 Vance J. VanDoren, How Communications Help Integration Projects Succeed, CONTROL 
ENGINEERING, Apr. 1, 2009, at 42, 43 fig. 
 83 Warwick Ashford, On-Demand Service Aims to Cut Cost of Fixing Software Security Flaws, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (July 14, 2009, 1:00 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2009/07/14/ 
236875/on-demand-service-aims-to-cut-cost-of-fixing-software-security.htm. 
 84 Kelly Jackson Higgins, The Cost of Fixing an Application Vulnerability, DARK READING (May 11, 
2009, 1:56 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/security/app-security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=217400256 
(analyzing results from United Kingdom firms). 
 85 Joy Persaud, Cost of Fixing Software Defects ‘Runs into Millions,’ SC MAG. (July 18, 2008), 
http://www.scmagazineuk.com/Cost-of-fixing-software-defects-runs-into-millions/article/112597. 
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Quality Engineering—are compensated directly for their work by the software 
vendor (their employer).86  Consultants, too, earn remuneration from the 
vendor by searching for flaws under contract.  Independent researchers, 
though, are neither paid by nor affiliated with the vendor.  They might benefit 
indirectly from their tasks, such as when a tester uses the software herself, 
works for a firm that does so, or employs testing as a signal of skill or 
experience.87  But most hackers have an attenuated relationship at most with 
the producer of the code they try to break. 
Independent researchers test for a variety of reasons: possible future 
remuneration, intellectual satisfaction, peer recognition, ideological 
commitment, animus toward a particular vendor, and expectations in a larger 
community of testers, among others.88  In short, their incentives are diverse.  
Their actions represent another example of peer production—creation outside 
the standard market economy through a disaggregated, informal process.  
Scholars such as Jonathan Zittrain,89 Yochai Benkler,90 Eric S. Raymond,91 and 
Eric von Hippel92 have analyzed other instances of peer production, from 
mapping craters on Mars,93 to Wikipedia,94 to open source software,95 to 
kitesurfing.96  Independent bug hunters analyze software for many reasons, but 
few are linked directly to financial incentives. 
Thus, the standard incentives-based model for intellectual property does not 
apply to hackers.  Researchers who find bugs can rarely obtain IP protection 
for their discoveries, if at all.97  Vulnerability data consists of insight into how 
code functions, or fails to do so, and would be unprotectable under copyright 
as either an idea, or as an unauthorized derivative work of the underlying 
 
 86 TIAN, supra note 59. 
 87 See VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION, supra note 11. 
 88 See generally BRUCE STERLING, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN (1992) (reviewing the development of the 
hacker subculture in cyberspace). 
 89 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). 
 90 Benkler, supra note 10. 
 91 RAYMOND, supra note 12. 
 92 See sources cited supra note 11. 
 93 See Dawn Mission: Clickworkers, NASA, http://dawn.jpl.nasa.gov/clickworkers (last visited May 13, 
2011). 
 94 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 70–74 (2006). 
 95 Id. at 63–67. 
 96 VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION, supra note 11, at 103–04. 
 97 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (denying copyright protection to unauthorized derivative works); 
Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math: The Economics of Legalizing The Grey Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345, 348–
54 (2008) (describing how the adaptation right impedes creation of valuable derivative works). 
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program.98  While a patent on the bug might theoretically be available, the time 
lag for prosecution and the existence of the program as prior art make this 
possibility largely irrelevant.99  The incentives generated by IP law do little to 
spur independent researchers to test code. 
Intellectual property doctrine does have a more subtle, second-order effect 
on researchers’ behavior, but it affects how they distribute vulnerability data 
rather than whether they produce it.  Vendors’ goals for distribution effects are 
straightforward: they want to be the sole recipients of bug data.  IP law can be 
deployed to shape when, and with whom, hackers share information regardless 
of any effects on whether they conduct such research to begin with.  Put 
crudely, vendors frequently employ IP law as a gag order. 
This approach is significantly misguided.  Researchers have an easy and 
profitable distribution alternative to sharing data with vendors: they can sell 
their discoveries on the black market.100  Organized crime entities, malware 
operators, and governments pay well for vulnerabilities in important software 
products, particularly those with no known patch or defense.  Selling bug data 
to the underground is appealing for several reasons.  First, it is hard for 
vendors to detect these transactions: research on bugs takes place in private, as 
does the exchange of exploits for money.  Second, the black market typically 
pays better for bugs than the legitimate market does.101  In 2006, antivirus 
vendor Trend Micro found that code exploiting a vulnerability sells for 
$20,000–$30,000 depending upon how widely used the insecure software is 
and how reliable the exploit code is, while code that takes over a PC and adds 
it to a botnet goes for roughly $5,000.102  Finally, the legal risks are, ironically, 
likely lower in this setting.  If what a hacker does to enumerate a flaw is 
 
 98 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding 
Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure ineligible for copyright protection), aff’d by an equally divided court, 
516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
 99 In 2010, the average time from filing to patent issuance or abandonment was 35.3 months.  U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 19 tbl. 
(2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf. 
 100 Jaziar Radianti & Jose. J. Gonzalez, Toward a Dynamic Modeling of the Vulnerability Black Market 
4–7 (Workshop on the Econ. of Securing the Info. Infrastructure, No. 4898, 2006), available at http://wesii. 
econinfosec.org/draft.php?paper_id=44. 
 101 See Andy Greenberg, A Hacker’s Nasdaq, FORBES.COM (Aug. 9, 2007, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes. 
com/2007/07/06/security-software-hacking-tech-security-cx_ag_0706vulnmarket.html (“‘It’s hard to say no if 
the black market offers you $300,000,’ Aitel [chief technology officer of vulnerabilities broker, Immunity] 
says.”). 
 102 Ryan Naraine, Hackers Selling Vista Zero-Day Exploit, EWEEK.COM (Dec. 15, 2006), http://www. 
eweek.com/c/a/Security/Hackers-Selling-Vista-ZeroDay-Exploit. 
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potentially unlawful, she runs less risk by concealing this activity than by 
announcing it to the vendor, the security community, or the larger public.  Both 
participants to the illegal transaction have incentives to conceal it, and while 
they may face criminal penalties if caught, their risk of detection is typically 
low.103  The risk is clear: if hackers fear lawsuits for publishing vulnerability 
discoveries, they can opt to sell their findings on the black market at lower risk 
and greater reward, placing users at risk. 
Thus, intellectual property has but a muted effect on the production of 
vulnerability data by independent security researchers, but can have a profound 
effect on its distribution.  However, this impact is perverse: rather than push 
bug hunters into sharing information with vendors, it increases the 
attractiveness of distribution through illicit channels to consumers who are 
likely bad actors.  The black market is discreet and profitable.  Nonetheless, 
vendors continue to deploy a range of IP-based legal weapons in an attempt to 
control researchers.  The next Part examines these tools. 
II. THE VENDOR’S ARSENAL 
A. Copyright: Breaking the Censor’s Scissors 
The Great Firewall of China has holes.  Scholars at the University of 
Michigan found key flaws in part of the firewall, Green Dam-Youth Escort, 
created by Jinhui Computer System Engineering (JCSE or Jinhui).  JCSE built 
Green Dam to augment China’s formidable internet censorship apparatus; the 
Chinese government mandated that all computer manufacturers install—or at 
least ship—the firewall software on every new computer.104  Green Dam not 
only censored users’ internet access, it created significant security risks.  The 
Michigan researchers found that vulnerabilities in the code could permit 
malicious websites to take control of a user’s computer to steal personal 
information or to enlist the PC in a botnet.105 
 
 103 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (amended 2008) (penalizing unauthorized access to computer 
systems with imprisonment and fines). 
 104 Edward Wong & Ashlee Vance, China Intent on Requiring Internet Censor Software, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2009, at A10. 
 105 Scott Wolchok et al., Analysis of the Green Dam Censorware System, COMPUTER SCI. & ENG’G AT 
THE UNIV. OF MICH. (June 18, 2009), http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/gd. 
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Jinhui—already under public pressure for helping China’s government 
censor the internet—responded with indignation and a threat.106  The 
company’s general manager stated, “It is not responsible to crack somebody’s 
software and publish the details, which are commercial secrets, on the Internet.  
[The Michigan researchers] have infringed the copyright of our product.”107  
He added that Jinhui planned to sue the researchers.108  While a suit in the 
United States would likely fail—reverse engineering is protected as fair use 
under U.S. copyright law109 and is considered a legitimate practice by trade 
secret doctrine110—and the Michigan team would have little to fear from legal 
action in China, this response typifies vendors’ reactions to public disclosure 
of vulnerabilities.  Jinhui patched some of the flaws that the Michigan team 
found, yet simultaneously threatened them for performing free quality 
control.111  To software companies like JSCE, the perception of security is 
often more important than security itself.  And when that perception is 
threatened, intellectual property threats are often their first response. 
The following sections detail the IP theories that software companies use, 
and the doctrinal adjustments this Article argues are necessary to protect 
security research. 
B. Patent 
Chris Paget was going to give a presentation at the Black Hat conference in 
2007 that would show how to clone an RFID (radio frequency identifier) 
chip—the kind used in cards to control access to buildings, in tags that allow 
drivers to pay tolls without stopping, and in passports to verify one’s 
identity.112  His subject was an RFID sensor made by HID Global; Paget chose 
the company because it produced the ID cards in the building where his 
employer, IOActive, was located.113 
 
 106 Edward Wong, China: Artist Urges Online Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A11; Green Dam 
Breached, Patch-Up in Progress, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (June 15, 2009, 8:39 AM), http://english.people. 
com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6678151.html. 
 107 Green Dam Breached, Patch-Up in Progress, supra note 106. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 110 See, e.g., Chi. Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 111 Green Dam Breached, Patch-Up in Progress, supra note 106. 
 112 Paul F. Roberts, Lawsuits, Patent Claims Silence Black Hat Talk, INFOWORLD (Feb. 27, 2007, 9:30 
AM), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/lawsuits-patent-claims-silence-black-hat-talk-720. 
 113 Paul F. Roberts, Battle Brewing over RFID Chip-Hacking Demo, INFOWORLD (Feb. 26, 2007, 3:45 
PM), http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/02/26/HNblackhatrfid_1.html. 
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HID Global objected, strongly.  Their letter to IOActive demanded that the 
research firm not publish information about how to “spoof” HID’s cards, or 
face legal action for patent infringement.114  HID asserted Paget’s cloning 
would violate two of its patents, which cover an identification system using 
passive integrated transponders.115  The threat created significant legal risk for 
Paget and IOActive: if their cloner was covered by the claims of one or more 
of HID’s patents and they proceeded in the face of the vendor’s warnings, they 
would be liable for willful patent infringement.  Willful infringement subjects 
a defendant to increased damages—up to three times actual damages116—and 
attorney’s fees.117  Patent law operates under strict liability: if Paget’s actions 
constituted using HID’s invention, he would be liable, regardless of how 
laudatory his purpose.  He and IOActive decided not to give the offending 
presentation, and Black Hat staffers tore their prepared materials out of the 
conference packets.118  Instead, the researchers gave a generic presentation, 
with no mention of HID or its technology.119 
Patent protection is among the most powerful weapons a software vendor 
can deploy to control its code.  Patent law confers a monopoly over making, 
using, selling, or offering to sell the protected invention.120  Infringement 
operates under strict liability: anyone who creates a product, or performs a 
process, that incorporates all elements listed in a patent’s claims violates the 
patent owner’s rights.121  Defenses are scant,122 and damages are at least a 
 
 114 Letter from HID Global to IOActive (Feb. 21, 2007) (on file with authors). 
 115 See U.S. Patent No. 5,041,826 (filed Feb. 16, 1990); U.S. Patent No. 5,166,676 (filed Feb. 16, 1990). 
 116 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(noting that the court earlier held that “an award of enhanced damages requires a showing of willful 
infringement”). 
 117 35 U.S.C. § 285; see also Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (attorney’s 
fees available in exceptional cases). 
 118 Ryan Naraine, Legal Threat Forces Cancellation of Black Hat RFID Hacking Demo, ZDNET ZERO 
DAY (Feb. 27, 2007, 6:50 AM), http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=102&tag=col1;post-103. 
 119 Larry Greenemeier, Black Hat ‘RFID’ Compromise Is a Win for Security, INFORMATIONWEEK (Feb. 
28, 2007), http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=197700210. 
 120 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). 
 121 See, e.g., Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 122 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (amended 2010) (permitting limited infringement for regulatory data submission); 
id. § 273 (defining prior inventor defense); id. § 282 (defining noninfringement, unenforceability, invalidity, 
and failure to comply with reissue requirements); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372–73 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (defining patent misuse).  But see 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (listing conduct not qualifying as 
misuse); Akron Polymer Container, Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(defining inequitable conduct before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office); Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., 
Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (defining first use or patent exhaustion); Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. 
Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (defining implied license). 
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reasonable royalty for use plus interest.123  There is no fair use in patent law: at 
most, an “experimental use” exception immunizes use of an invention for 
“amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”124  
Any commercial use places an infringer outside this safe harbor.125  Thus, 
patent law incorporates none of the utility calculus present in the copyright126 
or trademark127 fair use defenses; no matter how beneficial a researcher’s 
findings, if they are obtained in violation of a patent, without authorization, the 
researcher is liable. 
Paget and IOActive made the rational choice to alter their presentation.  
But society is ill served by patent’s strict liability in the software security 
context.  RFID tags, for example, are becoming ubiquitous, appearing in 
subway fare cards,128 animal identification implants,129 library books,130 
bicycle race trackers,131 and shipments of Oxycontin.132  Vulnerabilities in 
their operation133 have become particularly worrisome now that RFIDs play a 
key role in governmental operations such as border control (passports134) and 
Department of Defense procurement.135  Paget demonstrated the risks: with a 
few hundred dollars of equipment loaded into his Volvo, he was able to “skim” 
the serial numbers for six passport cards within an hour of driving along San 
 
 123 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 124 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded on other 
grounds by statute, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
§ 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006)) (permitting acts otherwise considered 
infringement, such as in Bolar, when in the narrow context of pursuing FDA approval). 
 125 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 126 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994). 
 127 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306–08 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(describing fair use). 
 128 Andrew Heining, Another RFID Smart Card Vulnerability Exposed, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 8, 
2008, 1:10 PM), http://features.csmonitor.com/innovation/2008/10/08/another-rfid-smart-card-vulnerability-
exposed. 
 129 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE NATIONAL ANIMAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (NAIS) (2007), 
available at http://www.ftcldf.org/docs/R.pdf. 
 130 See, e.g., David Molnar & David Wagner, Privacy and Security in Library RFID: Issues, Practices, 
and Architectures, 11 PROC. ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 210 (2004). 
 131 Daniel Lee, Just 1 Minute, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 25, 2006, at 1C. 
 132 Elena Malykhina, Drugmaker Ships RFID Tags with OxyContin, INFORMATIONWEEK, Nov. 22, 2004, 
at 20. 
 133 See, e.g., Russell Ryan et al., Anatomy of a Subway Hack (2008) (PowerPoint presentation), 
http://tech.mit.edu/V128/N30/subway/Defcon_Presentation.pdf (describing how MIT students hacked the 
RFID-based Charlie Card system for the Boston subway system). 
 134 See, e.g., U.S. Passport Card, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/passport/ppt_card/ppt_card_ 
3926.html (last visited May 13, 2011). 
 135 See, e.g., Radio Frequency Identification, 48 C.F.R. § 252.211–7006 (2010). 
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Francisco’s Fisherman’s Wharf.136  Despite these problems, researchers cannot 
lawfully test HID’s RFID chips without authorization, and even if they go 
ahead without permission, they cannot legally distribute their findings, since 
doing so would prove infringement.  HID thus obtains an effective veto over 
probing its patented products to assess their security. 
Change to protect software security research could come from revising the 
Patent Act or reinterpreting the experimental use exception.137  Legislation to 
exempt security research from infringement would be in line with prior moves 
to create exceptions to liability.  Congress has previously created exemptions 
for socially beneficial uses that would otherwise infringe, from protecting 
doctors against liability for using protected surgical methods138 to allowing 
prior users of a patented business method to continue employing it.139  Creating 
a narrow exception to patent liability for security research would equally shield 
helpful activity that would otherwise be subject to injunctive prohibition.140  
Unlike the surgical methods exemption, though, any protection for security 
research would likely need to protect tools specifically adapted to the patented 
method, since software programs needed to probe a vulnerability could 
otherwise infringe contributorily.141 
Alternatively, federal courts (in particular the Federal Circuit) could 
reinterpret the experimental use exception to cover security research.142  This 
would necessitate extending immunity to commercial uses of a patent; current 
doctrine mandates that a defendant’s activity be noncommercial.143  Security 
research is often commercial, even if indirectly, and thus even widening the 
ambit of the common law exemption might not ameliorate the chilling effects.  
 
 136 Chips in Official IDs Raise Privacy Fears, FOXNEWS.COM, July 11, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,531720,00.html. 
 137 The much-anticipated Supreme Court decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), addressing 
the eligibility of business methods for patenting under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), does not appear to have 
changed the situation facing researchers.  Software remains eligible subject matter for patent protection, 
assuming it meets the other requirements for patentability.  See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227–28. 
 138 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
 139 Id. § 273(b). 
 140 Injunctive relief for patent infringement is typical, but not automatic.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 141 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A) (excluding from the exemption “use of a patented machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter in violation of [a surgical method] patent”). 
 142 See Deuterium Corp. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 624, 632 & n.14 (1990) (noting that 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1) did not alter the Bolar definition of the exception, but rather “changed the narrow application of 
the doctrine affecting reporting requirements for federal drug laws”). 
 143 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  See generally 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[1] (2010) (collecting experimental use cases). 
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The current experimental use exception tracks a bright-line divide between 
commercial and philosophical activity, rather than weighing the costs and 
benefits of the infringing acts.  However, given the history of specialized 
legislative exceptions in patent law, courts are probably more likely to defer to 
Congress than to engage in particularized cost–benefit analysis.144 
Patent law is a potent weapon for vendors who seek to limit creation and 
dissemination of vulnerability data.  While reinterpreting the experimental use 
exception to liability could help researchers, it is more likely that congressional 
action to establish a security research exception is necessary to overcome 
patent law’s negative effects. 
C. Trade Secret 
There may be such a thing as a free lunch—and free laundry, and soft 
drinks—at schools that use the Blackboard Transaction System (BTS).145  BTS 
lets students use their identification cards to pay for goods and services on 
campus.  Billy Hoffman, a student at the Georgia Institute of Technology, and 
Virgil Griffith, a student at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa, 
discovered fundamental flaws in Blackboard’s system.146  For example, BTS 
did not encrypt the data involved in processing a purchase; instead, the system 
depended on physical security to prevent access to the data.147  However, 
Hoffman easily bypassed Georgia Tech’s physical restrictions with a low-tech 
hack: he removed four screws holding a locked machine door in place with a 
“cheap metal knife.”148  Doing so gave him access to the devices that 
controlled the laundry room in which the box was located—and potentially to 
the rest of the system as well.149  Hoffman could now perform a replay attack 
 
 144 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (granting exemption from infringement liability for uses related to 
developing and submitting data under federal law regulating drugs). 
 145 See BLACKBOARD, BLACKBOARD TRANSACTION SYSTEM (2004), available at http://library.blackboard. 
com/docs/CS/Bb_Transaction_System_Brochure.pdf. 
 146 Virginia Heffernan, Internet Man of Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008 (Magazine), at 38; Michael 
Margolis, Card Systems Prove Insecure, W. COURIER (Macomb, Ill.), Apr. 25, 2003, http://media.www. 
westerncourier.com/media/storage/paper650/news/2003/04/25/News/Card-Systems.Prove.Insecure-
445193.shtml. 
 147 John R. Hall, Blackboard Transaction System Cease and Desist FAQ, YAK’S LAIR, http://www.yak. 
net/mirrors/bb-faq.html (last visited May 13, 2011). 
 148 Farhad Manjoo, The Copyright Cops Strike Again, SALON.COM (Apr. 15, 2003), http://dir.salon.com/ 
story/tech/feature/2003/04/15/acidus. 
 149 Acidus, CampusWide Wide Open, CRYPTOME, http://cryptome.org/campuswide.txt (last visited May 
13, 2011).  Hoffman published under the pseudonym Acidus.  Margolis, supra note 146. 
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against BTS.150  By monitoring communication over the BTS network during a 
transaction, Hoffman could duplicate it, giving him an unlimited supply of free 
laundry cycles and beverages. 
Hoffman contacted Blackboard about his findings, but claimed he was 
“blown off” by the company.151  He and Griffith subsequently planned to 
present their research on BTS vulnerabilities at the Interz0ne computer 
conference in Atlanta, Georgia.152  In addition, Hoffman wrote an article 
covering BTS weaknesses under a pseudonym for the hacker magazine 2600: 
The Hacker Quarterly.  He closed the piece by stating, “Hopefully this article 
will force Blackboard to change to a more secure system.”153 
It didn’t.  But Blackboard did manage to change Hoffman’s proposed talk.  
The day before Hoffman and Griffith were scheduled to present at Interz0ne, 
Blackboard obtained a temporary injunction from a Georgia state court 
blocking them from: discussing signal traffic on a BTS network; revealing how 
information was stored in the BTS system or readers; describing how to create 
compatible readers; releasing Blackboard emulation code or hardware; or 
claiming they could provide products or services that legitimately could 
interact with a Blackboard product.154  The injunction also required the 
students to remove any such information from their websites.155  Finally, 
Blackboard sent a letter to Interz0ne’s conference chair stating that the 
conference could be held liable, even criminally liable, if it permitted Hoffman 
and Griffith to present their research, or if Interz0ne failed to remove 
information about BTS from its materials.156 
Blackboard relied on several legal theories to bolster its case for the 
temporary injunction, including violations of the Federal Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),157 
 
 150 Acidus, supra note 149. 
 151 Manjoo, supra note 148. 
 152 Margolis, supra note 146. 
 153 Acidus, supra note 149. 
 154 Order Temporarily Enjoining Billy Hoffman and Virgil Griffith, Blackboard Inc. v. Hoffman, No. 
1:03-CV-1279 (CC) (Ga. Super. Ct. Apr. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Order], available at http://www.eff.org/files/ 
filenode/Blackboard_v_Hoffman/20020412-Blackboard-TRO.pdf. 
 155 Id. at 2. 
 156 Cease and Desist Letter from Gregory S. Smith, Attorney for Blackboard Inc., to Interz0ne II 
Conference Chair (Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://www.interz0ne.com/events/interz0ne_cease_order.html. 
 157 The complaint refers to the “Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act” but cites the statutory sections for the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act “18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq.”  Verified Complaint at 7, Blackboard Inc. v. 
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the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act, and the Lanham Act, but 
focused principally on the Georgia Trade Secrets Act.158  Its complaint 
repeatedly referred to Hoffman’s hacker background, attempting to balance 
dire descriptions of the threat from his presentation with qualifications about 
the accuracy of Hoffman’s claims about BTS security.159  Blackboard claimed 
that the presentation risked “massive fraud, security breaches, and other harms, 
threatening both the physical and financial security of college students.”160 
Tellingly, though, Blackboard stated publicly that it wasn’t “really worried 
about [the] security of the system,” but instead was “worried about the 
reputation of the system.”161  Hoffman and Griffith focused attention on BTS’s 
dependence on physical protection for the system’s security—and on how 
readily those physical methods could be compromised.  Blackboard compared 
the students’ research to breaking into an ATM, eliding the far greater security 
protections built into those machines.162  The company sought both to 
minimize the findings, calling Hoffman a mere “vandal,” while also justifying 
the ban on disclosing information about the vulnerability with warnings about 
the risk Hoffman created.163  The restraining order, and a subsequent 
confidential settlement, blocked Hoffman and Griffith from presenting at 
Interz0ne, though the ensuing publicity drew attention to the BTS flaws.164  
Trade secret triumphed over toolboxes. 
Trade secret law protects information that has economic value because it is 
not generally known, and that is the subject of efforts to maintain its secrecy.165  
Examples include customer lists, Google’s algorithm for building search 
results,166 and the formula for Coca-Cola.167  Software can qualify for trade 
 
Hoffman, No. 1:03-CV-1279 (CC) (Ga. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2003), available at http://www.eff.org/ 
files/filenode/Blackboard_v_Hoffman/20020411-Blackboard-complaint.pdf. 
 158 Id. at 5–8. 
 159 Id. at 2–4, 8. 
 160 Id. at 8. 
 161 Anitha Reddy, Blackboard Gets Gag Order Against Smart-Card Hackers, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2003, 
at E1 (emphases added). 
 162 See, e.g., Andrea L. Foster, Judge Prevents Students from Discussing Security of Debit-Card System, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), May 2, 2003, at 40. 
 163 Blackboard Statement on Client System Security, BLACKBOARD, http://library.blackboard.com/docs/ 
Statement_on_System_Security.pdf (last visited May 13, 2011); see also Hall, supra note 147. 
 164 Heffernan, supra note 146. 
 165 See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005). 
 166 Tom McNichol, Can Microsoft’s Bing Take a Bite out of Google?, TIME (July 31, 2009), http://www. 
time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1913841,00.html. 
 167 2 Sentenced in Coke Trade Secret Case, CNNMONEY.COM (May 23, 2007, 3:54 PM), http://money. 
cnn.com/2007/05/23/news/newsmakers/coke/index.htm. 
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secret status, even when the compiled object code is sold to the public.168  
Trade secrets are protected by injunctions preventing their disclosure169 when a 
defendant has obtained them through improper means;170 holders can also 
obtain damages.171  However, trade secret laws expressly permit the use of 
reverse engineering to discover protected information; only the acquisition of a 
secret through improper means creates liability.172  Where researchers obtain 
information about security flaws in software or hardware through reverse 
engineering, their subsequent use and disclosure of that information is beyond 
the reach of trade secret liability.173  Accordingly, reform to protect researchers 
may require only that judges scrutinize trade secret claims more searchingly 
when reverse engineering is involved. 
However, there are at least two complications with trade secret law and 
software research.  First, software vendors often include language in the end-
user license agreement governing their software that forbids reverse 
engineering.174  While such language would be unlikely to create liability for 
copyright infringement, since limited reverse engineering typically qualifies as 
fair use,175 the contractual obligation might be sufficient to make a software 
user responsible for maintaining the trade secret.176  Copyright law faces a 
similar question when end-user license agreements prohibit reverse 
 
 168 See, e.g., Rivendell Forest Prods. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 169 See, e.g., Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 170 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West 2010) (defining “[i]mproper means” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 171 See, e.g., Sikes v. McGraw-Edison Co., 665 F.2d 731, 736–37 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 172 Chi. Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982); Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer 
Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105 (Del. Ch. 1975).  See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
 173 The Georgia Trade Secrets Act expressly exempts from liability information acquired from reverse 
engineering.  GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-761(1) (2009) (“Reverse engineering of a trade secret not acquired by 
misappropriation or independent development shall not be considered improper means.”). 
 174 For example, Microsoft expressly forbids reverse engineering in the license agreement for its Windows 
XP operating system.  MICROSOFT, MICROSOFT WINDOWS XP HOME EDITION (RETAIL) END-USER LICENSE 
AGREEMENT FOR MICROSOFT SOFTWARE § 4 (2004), available at http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/ 
eula/home.mspx.  Some vendors are even more restrictive: Network Associates promulgated an end-user 
license agreement that required the company’s approval before publishing reviews or disclosing results from 
testing the software.  Ed Foster, Some New Shrink-Wrap License Terms Seem Tailor-Made for UCITA, 
INFOWORLD, Mar. 5, 2001, at 82, 87.  The New York state attorney general filed suit to block this provision as 
contrary to consumer protection laws and won an order prohibiting Network Associates from enforcing it.  
People v. Network Assocs., Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 466, 471 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (granting injunction requested by 
attorney general). 
 175 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 176 See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993). 
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engineering; even where decompilation would be protected by fair use,177 such 
action would create liability for breach of contract.178  The effort to regulate 
contract law for computer information transactions via the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act (UCITA), for example, recognized the potential 
adverse effects of such contractual provisions.179  Indeed, the 2002 version of 
UCITA prohibited contracts banning reverse engineering by declaring them 
unenforceable.180  However, UCITA’s effects have been minimal, as only two 
states have transposed its provisions into law.181  Thus, vendors may be able to 
circumvent trade secret’s safe harbor via contract. 
Second, some researchers may switch sides, working first as an employee 
or consultant, and then moving to perform independent testing.  In this case, 
the software company may have a plausible claim that the researcher’s work is 
influenced by her knowledge of the firm’s trade secrets.  Mike Lynn’s situation 
with Cisco exemplifies this problem; Lynn began his work on the flaws in 
Cisco’s routers while covered by a nondisclosure agreement.182  Once he 
resigned from his position with ISS, Lynn transitioned to independent research, 
but Cisco argued, plausibly, that his work was influenced by exposure to 
Cisco’s proprietary information.183 
The case for legal reform in the trade secret context is more compelling for 
reverse engineering than for researchers who switch sides.  Allowing software 
companies to reify a license agreement into a trade secret claim would confer 
complete control over research into vulnerabilities in software that involves 
any decompilation or reverse engineering—which most security testing 
does.184  Accepting the terms of a software end-user license agreement is 
 
 177 See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding 
reverse engineering can constitute fair use). 
 178 See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323–28 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding 
restrictions consistent with the Copyright Act, finding breach of a license agreement prohibiting reverse 
engineering, and affirming monetary damages award). 
 179 We thank Maureen O’Rourke for this insight. 
 180 UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 118(b) (amended 2002), 7 U.L.A. pt. 2, at 290 (2009 & 
Supp. 2010); see also Jonathan Band, Closing the Interoperability Gap: NCCUSL’s Adoption of a Reverse 
Engineering Exception in UCITA, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., May 2002, at 1, 4. 
 181 Maryland and Virginia have adopted the UCITA.  See Maryland Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 22-102 to -816 (West 2010); Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to -509.2 (West 2010). 
 182 Cisco Acts to Silence Researcher, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4724791.stm 
(last updated July 28, 2005). 
 183 Complaint for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, Copyright, and Breach of Contract at 3–7, Cisco 
Sys., Inc. v. Lynn, No. C05-03043-JL (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005). 
 184 See ELDAD EILAM, REVERSING: SECRETS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING 7–8 (2005). 
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generally a prerequisite for using a lawful copy of that program.  Researchers 
thus face a cruel choice: either use an unlawful copy in their research, or agree 
to terms preventing them from engaging in the activity that necessitates 
installing the program.  To mitigate this problem, courts interpreting software 
license agreements, and state legislatures adopting and modifying trade secret 
statutes, should reinforce the position that reverse engineering does not 
constitute improper means.185  Provisions banning reverse engineering could 
be voided on public policy grounds, for example.  In addition, security research 
should be exempted from trade secret liability, unless the plaintiff can prove 
improper means.186  An exemption would shift the burden of proof to the 
software’s owner and would continue to protect against breaches of 
nondisclosure agreements.  This proposal accords with the goal of trade secret 
doctrine, which is to enable the protection of proprietary information that 
confers a competitive advantage.  Security researchers seek not to compete 
with the software they test, but to improve its resilience and robustness.  
Further, breach of an end-user license agreement should give rise, at most, to a 
claim for breach of contract.  Unlike trade secret claims, contract-based ones 
rarely justify injunctive relief, and plaintiffs must prove actual damages to 
recover.187 
Trade secret doctrine is created primarily by state law, although theft of 
trade secrets can create federal criminal liability.188  Thus, ensuring uniform 
protection for security research requires either action by each state to protect 
reverse engineering, or a federal statute enshrining this shield nationally.  
While some states already safeguard reverse engineering via statute, 
researchers may nonetheless face restrictions based on trade secret law.  
Hoffman and Griffith, for example, were subject to a temporary restraining 
order based in part on Blackboard’s trade secret claim,189 even though 
 
 185 Trade secrets statutes typically prohibit acquisition of protected information via improper means.  
Most states follow the formulation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which defines improper means as 
including “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or 
espionage through electronic or other means.”  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 
537 (2005).  States such as California expressly protect reverse engineering as an exception to trade secret 
liability.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2010) (“Reverse engineering or independent derivation alone 
shall not be considered improper means.”). 
 186 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j) (2006) (DMCA security research exemption). 
 187 See Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. 
REV. 346, 348, 351 (1981). 
 188 See 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2006). 
 189 See Order, supra note 154; Verified Complaint, supra note 157, at 6. 
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Georgia’s trade secret statute exempts reverse engineering from liability.190  
Accordingly, even states that protect reverse engineering in theory may need 
stronger liability shields in practice.  This suggests that, if states fail to accord 
adequate protection to software security research as a legitimate activity under 
their trade secret laws, Congress may need to pass safe harbor legislation that 
preempts conflicting state statutes.  Though trade secret law is historically the 
province of state regulation, the Federal Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
criminalizes the theft, copying, distribution, sale, or receipt of unlawfully 
acquired trade secrets.191  If federal law can be employed to augment trade 
secret when necessary, it can (and should) be deployed to limit the doctrine 
when its effects are pernicious. 
D. Trademark 
Unsurprisingly, trademark has been the legal doctrine least frequently 
employed by vendors to control software security research.  Researchers are 
normally careful to note that their work does not bear the imprimatur or 
approval of a software vendor, and any references to a product or service 
would likely fall under the nominative use exception to trademark liability.192  
Furthermore, hackers are not offering competing products or appealing to 
consumers in a way that could cause confusion about source.193  Blackboard, 
for example, included a claim under federal trademark law (the Lanham Act) 
in its complaint against Hoffman and Griffith over their BTS work.194  As the 
Chilling Effects project notes, though, their position was “far-fetched at best,” 
since Hoffman was neither passing off his work as Blackboard’s, nor implying 
endorsement by the company.195  Researchers are at pains both to claim credit 
for their work, and to demonstrate when a vendor has failed to follow their 
independent advice. 
Trademark law—at least, federal trademark law—likely does not require 
modification to protect security research.  However, exemption from liability 
does involve thoughtful judicial application of doctrine.  For example, the 
 
 190 See supra note 173. 
 191 See 18 U.S.C. § 1832. 
 192 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(describing nominative use). 
 193 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006) (prohibiting use of a mark that is likely to cause confusion about 
origin, sponsorship, or approval). 
 194 Verified Complaint, supra note 157, at 6–7. 
 195 Jennifer Jenkins, Blackboard Erases Research Presentation with Cease-and-Desist, TRO, CHILLING 
EFFECTS (Sept. 30, 2003), http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?WeatherID=383. 
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nominative use defense (one species of trademark’s fair use defense) should 
immunize researchers who use a software product’s mark to denominate the 
code to which their findings apply.196  If hackers are careful in how they 
describe their work, consumer confusion should be minimal if not nonexistent.  
Similarly, federal dilution law provides express protection for nominative and 
descriptive fair use (including use to criticize or comment on the mark’s 
owner), for news commentary employing a mark, and for noncommercial 
use.197  Courts in different circuits, though, apply the nominative use defense 
differently.198  Some judges may be receptive to vendors’ suggestions that the 
use of their marks implies sponsorship or approval of the security researcher’s 
work, on a likelihood of confusion theory.199  Researchers would improve their 
chances of successfully asserting a nominative fair use defense through steps 
that reduce the potential to confuse computer consumers, such as through 
disclaimer statements that expressly negate any connection between the hacker 
and the software vendor.200 
While trademark law has seen limited use against security researchers, the 
doctrine’s built-in safeguards suggest that legal reform may not be 
immediately necessary so long as they are conscientiously applied. 
E. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 
Though there are few court cases applying it to security research, the 
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) recur frequently as a threat employed against hackers.  In 2002, 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) fulminated against SNOsoft’s publishing code that 
permitted an attacker to gain root (administrator) privileges on HP’s Tru64 
Unix operating system via a buffer overflow exploit, characterizing it as a 
 
 196 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307–08 (discussing nominative use). 
 197 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
 198 Compare Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(positioning nominative fair use as affirmative defense), with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 
801 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a nominative use defense simply changes the likelihood of confusion 
methodology), superseded by statute on other grounds, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)), as recognized in Levi Strauss & Co. v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 199 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A). 
 200 Cf. Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 231 (“[A] disclaimer must be considered in determining 
whether the alleged infringer accurately portrayed the relationship that existed between plaintiff and 
defendant.”). 
BAMBAUER&DAY GALLEYSFINAL 6/6/2011  10:27 AM 
2011] THE HACKER’S AEGIS 1081 
DMCA violation.201  Though HP invoked the specter of criminal sanctions for 
SNOsoft’s post,202 the researchers also faced civil liability.203  HP had known 
about the vulnerability since 2001—a different researcher had posted a 
separate exploit that achieved root access—but had not issued a patch.204  
When HP Chief Executive Carly Fiorina and the company were inundated with 
complaints from researchers, reporters, and even HP employees, the firm 
retreated from its threats against SNOsoft.205  Nonetheless, the incident 
prompted a number of attendees at the Black Hat conference that year to 
consider the possibility of reducing vulnerability sharing with vendors,206 and 
HP stated that it would forgo legal threats if researchers would “reveal security 
threats using industry standard security practice.”207 
Similarly, in 2003, Princeton graduate student J. Alex Halderman (now a 
professor at the University of Michigan) analyzed MediaMax CD3, a copy 
protection scheme for music CDs from SunnComm.208  SunnComm claimed 
that the program offered “a verifiable and commendable level of security,” but 
Halderman found that computer users could evade its restrictions through the 
simple expedient of holding down the Shift key (thereby disabling Microsoft 
Windows’ Autorun feature) when loading the CD.209  Doing so kept the disc 
from loading a device driver that blocked users from copying music.210  Users 
who allowed the CD to install the driver software could also disable it using 
instructions Halderman provided.211 
 
 201 Declan McCullagh, Security Warning Draws DMCA Threat, CNET NEWS (July 30, 2002, 4:48 PM), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-947325.html; see also Letter from Kent Ferson, Vice President, Hewlett-
Packard Unix Sys. Unit, to Adriel T. Desautels, Founder, SNOsoft (July 29, 2002), available at http://www. 
politechbot.com/docs/hp.dmca.threat.073002.html. 
 202 McCullagh, supra note 201. 
 203 See 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a), (c) (2006); McCullagh, supra note 201. 
 204 McCullagh, supra note 201.  The exploit code is available at http://packetstorm.linuxsecurity.com/ 
0101-exploits/tru-64.su.c. 
 205 Kim Zetter, HP, Bug-Hunters Declare Truce, PCWORLD (Aug. 9, 2002, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/103853/hp_bughunters_declare_truce.html. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Declan McCullagh, HP Backs Down on DMCA Warning, ZDNET UK (Aug. 2, 2002, 7:45 AM), 
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/itmanagement/0,1000000308,2120211,00.htm (quoting HP General Manager Martin 
Fink) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 208 J. Alex Halderman, Analysis of the MediaMax CD3 Copy-Prevention System, COMPUTER SCI. & 
ENG’G AT THE UNIV. OF MICH. (Nov. 13, 2004), http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/cd3. 
 209 Id.  See generally Brij Khurana, Halderman GS Sees Copy-Protection Flaw in New CDs, DAILY 
PRINCETONIAN, Oct. 9, 2003, http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/2003/10/09/8785 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 210 Halderman, supra note 208. 
 211 Khurana, supra note 209. 
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Halderman’s work had a significant effect—SunnComm’s stock dropped in 
value by $10 million in the days after its release.212  SunnComm responded.  
The company released a statement indicating that it would sue Halderman for 
violating the DMCA and would refer the matter to federal law enforcement for 
possible criminal proceedings.213  The company specifically cited his paper 
(published on Halderman’s website) as “‘disseminated in a manner which 
facilitates infringement’ in violation of the DMCA or other applicable law,”214 
calling it potentially “a felony.”215  The company later acknowledged the 
potential chilling effect of such lawsuits on academic security research.216 
Both HP and SunnComm rescinded their threats after a wave of 
unfavorable publicity.  But the threat of suit under the DMCA has impeded 
research into software vulnerabilities, even by academics at major 
universities.217  Halderman and Ed Felten, his advisor, delayed publishing data 
about security flaws in the Sony BMG copy protection system for CDs for a 
month while consulting counsel about managing DMCA risk.218  While they 
did so, consumers of Sony music CDs remained vulnerable to hackers who 
could use a flaw in the anti-copying software to surreptitiously install software 
on their computers.219  (Felten was familiar with DMCA threats, having faced 
one from the Secure Digital Music Initiative when he cracked the group’s 
music watermarking scheme and sought to present his research at an academic 
 
 212 John Borland, Student Faces Suit over Key to CD Locks, CNET NEWS (Oct. 9, 2003, 2:01 PM), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1025-5089168.html. 
 213 Tony Smith, SunnComm to Sue ‘Shift Key’ Student for $10m, REGISTER (Oct. 9, 2003, 8:48 PM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/10/09/sunncomm_to_sue_shift_key. 
 214 Id. (quoting a SunnComm press release) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 215 Declan McCullagh, SunnComm Won’t Sue Grad Student, ZDNET (Oct. 10, 2003, 9:16 PM), 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-132123.html. 
 216 Press Release, SunnComm Techs. Inc., SunnComm Technologies Reverses Decision to Bring Legal 
Action Against Princeton Researcher (Oct. 10, 2003), http://web.archive.org/web/20031016165917/ 
http://www.sunncomm.com/press/pressrelease.asp?prid=200310101150. 
 217 See generally FRED VON LOHMANN, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: TWELVE 
YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (2010), available at http://www.eff.org/files/eff-unintended-consequences-12-
years.pdf; J. Alex Halderman, Princeton Univ., Legal Challenges in Security Research (Oct. 12, 2006) 
(PowerPoint presentation), available at http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/talks/lawsec-ufl06.ppt. 
 218 Comment of Edward W. Felten & J. Alex Halderman to the U.S. Copyright Office, Regarding RM 
2005-11—Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control 
Technologies (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/doc/2005/dmcacomment.pdf. 
 219 The Sony BMG software employed a rootkit—a storage space invisible to the operating system—to 
hide its tools.  Mark Russinovich, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far, MARK’S 
BLOG (Oct. 31, 2005, 11:04 AM), http://blogs.technet.com/markrussinovich/archive/2005/10/31/sony-rootkits-
and-digital-rights-management-gone-too-far.aspx.  However, attackers could also conceal their software in the 
rootkit.  See John Borland, Sony CD Protection Sparks Security Concerns, CNET NEWS (Nov. 1, 2005, 4:41 
PM), http://news.cnet.com/Sony-CD-protection-sparks-security-concerns/2100-7355_3-5926657.html. 
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conference.)220  Andrew “Bunnie” Huang had two companies—including a 
self-publishing firm—back out of publishing his book on hacking Microsoft’s 
Xbox (including analysis of the system’s security) due to fears of DMCA 
liability.221  University of Michigan graduate student Niels Provos moved his 
research publications out of the United States and tried to block American 
citizens from accessing them due to fears of running afoul of the DMCA and a 
similar Michigan state statute.222  Even White House Office of Cyber Security 
chief Richard Clarke cited the “potential chilling effect on vulnerability 
research” in a speech at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.223  The 
DMCA has proved a potent weapon, enabling software companies to dissuade 
or limit security researchers, and its power is perhaps best demonstrated by its 
ability to compel adherence even with infrequent formal legal proceedings. 
The DMCA contains statutory exceptions that could shield security 
researchers from liability, including protections for reverse engineering,224 
encryption research,225 and security testing.226  However, the safe harbors are 
so narrow that they are effectively useless, as the extant caselaw demonstrates.  
Of 141 decided cases involving § 1201 of the DMCA, only one involved a 
claim of protection under the security testing safe harbor, and in it the safe 
harbor was held inapplicable.227  The same case was the only one to involve an 
unsuccessful attempt to rely on the encryption research exemption,228 and four 
cases had unsuccessful claims for the reverse engineering safe harbor.229  
While these results cover only reported, decided cases (and hence may not be a 
representative sample), the lack of success in using any of the safe harbors—
 
 220 See Scott A. Craver et al., Reading Between the Lines: Lessons from the SDMI Challenge, 10 PROC. 
USENIX SECURITY SYMP. (2001), available at http://www.usenix.org/events/sec01/craver.pdf. 
 221 David Becker, Testing Microsoft and the DMCA, CNET NEWS (Apr. 15, 2003, 4:00 AM), http://news. 
cnet.com/2008-1082-996787.html (quoting Huang’s description of “a flaw in the system initializer that lets 
you put code anywhere in the system that you want it”). 
 222 Kevin Poulsen, ‘Super-DMCA’ Fears Suppress Security Research, SECURITYFOCUS (Apr. 14, 2003), 
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/3912. 
 223 Hiawatha Bray, Cyber Chief Speaks on Data Network Security, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2002, at C2. 
 224 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006). 
 225 Id. § 1201(g). 
 226 Id. § 1201(j). 
 227 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 228 Id. 
 229 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004); Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Divineo, Inc., 457 F. 
Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294. 
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and the infrequency with which they are raised—suggests that the built-in 
statutory mechanisms are insufficiently protective of security researchers. 
This conclusion is bolstered by qualitative analysis of the exemptions.  To 
qualify for the security testing safe harbor, a researcher must: obtain 
authorization from the owner of the computer, system, or network involved in 
testing (which might be particularly challenging for cloud-computing 
research); not violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA); use 
findings solely to improve the security of the computer, system, or network’s 
owner, or share them directly with the network, system, or computer’s 
developer; and use or maintain the information derived from testing so as not 
to facilitate DMCA infringement or violate other applicable laws, such as those 
related to privacy and security.230  Similarly, to assess vulnerabilities in 
software encryption, such as that employed in the Transport Layer Security 
protocol used to protect e-commerce,231 a researcher must lawfully obtain a 
copy of the software or hardware, seek authorization from the owner of the 
rights in that technology, and not violate other laws (including the CFAA).232  
Moreover, the statute conditions the exemption on the researcher’s 
qualifications, the way in which she disseminates her findings, and whether the 
researcher provides the copyright owner with documentation of findings in a 
timely fashion.233  The statutory safe harbors are not only narrow, but also 
uncertain—it is not always clear what conduct violates laws such as the CFAA, 
nor what constitutes timely provision of information to copyright owners.234 
The DMCA permits users who are adversely affected by its restrictions in 
their ability to make noninfringing uses of copyrighted works to petition the 
Librarian of Congress to exempt certain classes of works from the statute’s 
ambit.235  However, these exemptions expire after three years, and a user who 
seeks to continue the exemption must petition for renewal from scratch.236  The 
first three rounds of exemption rule making did not result in additional 
 
 230 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1)–(3). 
 231 See Marsh Ray, Authentication Gap in TLS Renegotiation, EXTENDED SUBSET (Nov. 5, 2009, 3:20 
AM), http://extendedsubset.com/?p=8. 
 232 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(2). 
 233 Id. § 1201(g)(3). 
 234 On the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), see generally United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 
(C.D. Cal. 2009), in which a court granted a motion for acquittal for a defendant convicted of violating CFAA 
via conduct that contravened MySpace’s terms of service. 
 235 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)–(D). 
 236 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control 
Technologies, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,073 (Oct. 6, 2008) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
BAMBAUER&DAY GALLEYSFINAL 6/6/2011  10:27 AM 
2011] THE HACKER’S AEGIS 1085 
protections that could benefit security researchers.237  The last round of rule 
making included one exemption for security testing of video games, provided 
the information derived is used primarily to promote the security of the owner 
or operator of a computer, computer system, or network, and the information is 
not used or maintained such that it facilitates unlawful activity.238  This 
exemption is quite similar to the existing statutory exemption for security 
testing, but is intended to cover situations where the researcher is not trying to 
gain access to a computer, system, or network.239  In short, while it is possible 
for adversely affected users to petition for exemptions from liability, such 
exemptions are narrow, short-lived, and vigorously opposed by vendors.240 
Reform of the DMCA to provide greater protection for software security 
research is straightforward.  As currently written, the statute canonizes one 
type, or industry structure, for such research.241  It requires that, to fall within 
the safe harbor for security testing, a researcher must perform her activities 
with the authorization of the owner or operator of the system or network.242  
Thus, the DMCA protects research where the investigator operates under 
contract with the software vendor or cloud-computing system operator, but 
leaves independent researchers vulnerable.  This type of research is carried out 
by corporate security firms such as Verisign iDefense Labs, Defensive 
Thinking, or Symantec.  Individual researchers or smaller companies may have 
trouble obtaining authorization due to negotiation costs or because software 
firms simply may not trust them. 
To change the DMCA to more broadly protect the activity of security 
research, rather than simply one organizational form of it, Congress should 
either amend the relevant statutory subsection, or simply treat the DMCA 
under a more generalized shield law.  To carry out piecemeal reform, the 
DMCA should focus on the activity of the security researcher, not on purpose 
or on authorization.  (Ironically, the current statutory exemption implicitly 
recognizes the key role of the distribution of vulnerability information—it 
conditions the safe harbor in part on whether the researcher shares the data 
 
 237 Anticircumvention Rulemaking, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/1201 (last updated 
Feb. 7, 2011). 
 238 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)(4) (2010). 
 239 75 Fed. Reg. 43,825, 43,833 (July 27, 2010) (codified as amended at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40). 
 240 See id. at 43,832–33 (documenting arguments of opponents to video game security exemption). 
 241 See generally Cross, supra note 25, at 39 (noting that vital security tools, such as Nmap, NetCat, and 
OllyDbg, were developed by independent researchers). 
 242 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1) (2006). 
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directly with the computer system owner or software developer.)243  In 
particular, we suggest removing the requirement of obtaining authorization 
from the owner of the computer, system, or network.  Overall, though, we 
believe that more comprehensive reform, which treats the DMCA as one 
aspect of IP problems facing security researchers, is preferable. 
The DMCA illustrates the potency of intellectual property threats to 
security research by showing how dissemination of information can be chilled 
even without filing suit.  This Part has demonstrated the tools available to 
software vendors to muzzle researchers.  The next Part describes how to 
mitigate this problem. 
III.  CREATING THE AEGIS 
To protect researchers’ valuable contributions to software security, and to 
ensure that vulnerability information remains in legitimate channels rather than 
being sold on the black market, we propose three changes: one legal, one in 
social norms, and one market-based. 
A. Legal Reform 
Our proposed legal reform seeks to shape researchers’ behavior by 
conditioning a grant of immunity from IP suits on adherence to rules of 
conduct.  Providing a safe harbor from liability strongly encourages those at 
risk to act in ways that remain within the exemption.  For example, the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act provides a safe harbor for service providers who, 
upon notice from a copyright holder, disable access to or remove allegedly 
infringing content.244  Most large providers, as a matter of course, remove 
content upon notification without inquiring into the merits of the alleged 
infringement claim or into their potential risk exposure.245  While this approach 
 
 243 See id. § 1201(j)(3) (stating that one factor to determine whether one qualifies for the exemption is 
“whether the information derived from the security testing was . . . shared directly with the developer of such 
computer, computer system, or computer network”). 
 244 Id. § 512(c). 
 245 See, e.g., Michael Piatek et al., Challenges and Directions for Monitoring P2P File Sharing 
Networks—or—Why My Printer Received a DMCA Takedown Notice, 3 USENIX WORKSHOP ON HOT TOPICS 
SECURITY (2008), available at http://www.usenix.org/event/hotsec08/tech/full_papers/piatek/piatek.pdf; 
Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 
512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006). 
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has generated controversy, it is more certain and less expensive to stay within 
the safe harbor.246 
Similarly, if software security researchers can avail themselves of 
immunity from IP infringement claims by acting in certain ways, it is likely 
they will conform their behavior to those requirements.  Many researchers 
have limited resources and legal acumen, making them risk-averse regarding 
litigation and thus more likely to track the exemption’s mandates.  Legal 
threats unquestionably influence researchers’ actions, as they learn from prior 
controversies.  For example, a trio of security experts demonstrated how to 
hack smartcard-based electronic parking meters at the Black Hat security 
conference in August 2009.247  The researchers deliberately chose to contact 
neither the vendor nor the owner of the meters they hacked, and asked 
reporters not to do so, citing the injunction entered against MIT researchers 
who showed how to obtain free rides on Boston’s subway system in 2008.248  
Hackers learn the relevant law quickly. 
Crafting the requirements for immunity is critical in two respects.  First, 
conditions for the exemption will strongly influence how hackers behave—
what they do while testing code, and what they do with the resulting 
information.249  Second, the safe harbor would deprive software vendors of 
potent legal tools and remedies.  If it immunizes undesirable behavior, it will 
inflict harm on software firms, and on society generally. 
Proper behavior for researchers is admittedly a contested issue within the 
software security community.250  Proposals vary from advocating full 
disclosure251 (publishing vulnerability details immediately upon discovery) to 
 
 246 See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Law Professor Wendy Seltzer Takes on the NFL, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Mar. 
21, 2007, 12:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/03/21/law-professor-wendy-seltzer-takes-on-the-nfl/tab/ 
article. 
 247 Joe Grand et al., “Smart” Parking Meter Implementations, Globalism, and You (2009) (PowerPoint 
presentation), http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/GRAND/BHUSA09-Grand-ParkingMeter-
SLIDES.pdf. 
 248 Kim Zetter, Smart Parking Meters Hacked—Free Parking for All!, WIRED THREAT LEVEL (July 30, 
2009, 4:51 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/parking-meters. 
 249 The proposed legal reform can therefore be seen as attempting to specify best practices for security 
research.  We are grateful to Michael J. Madison for this insight; he develops a similar idea for the fair use 
doctrine under copyright law in Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004). 
 250 See generally VIEGA, supra note 38, at 153–62. 
 251 Bruce Schneier, Debating Full Disclosure, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Jan. 23, 2007, 6:45 AM), 
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/01/debating_full_d.html (“Public scrutiny is the only reliable 
way to improve security . . . .”). 
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revealing bug data only to vendors.252  Heated debate is common253 and 
occasionally bleeds into active protests such as website hacking.254  The 
normative position we adopt, responsible disclosure, represents a middle 
ground that has won considerable support.255  Responsible disclosure requires 
researchers to notify vendors first on discovering vulnerabilities, but preserves 
the possibility of public dissemination to prod software firms to remediate 
flaws.256  We believe that the potential for full public disclosure under our 
proposal motivates vendors to issue patches and to press customers to install 
those fixes, while the prohibition on selling vulnerability data to third parties 
reduces the number of potential attackers until the vulnerability can be 
remedied.257 
The Hacker’s Aegis would set a default presumption that security 
researchers are acting lawfully, and would require plaintiffs (such as aggrieved 
software companies) to demonstrate that accused activity falls outside its 
protections.  In return for immunity from civil intellectual property claims, 
software security researchers would be required to adhere to five rules: tell the 
vendor first, don’t sell the bug, test on your own system, don’t weaponize, and 
create a trail. 
 
 252 The Anti-Sec Movement, for example, opposes full disclosure “for the purpose of making it harder for 
the security industry to exploit its consequences.”  See ImageShack—Pwned for Anti-Sec, SECLISTS.ORG (July 
11, 2009, 5:15 AM), http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Jul/95. 
 253 See, e.g., Marcus J. Ranum, The Vulnerability Disclosure Game: Are We More Secure?, CSO ONLINE 
(Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.csoonline.com/article/440110/The_Vulnerability_Disclosure_Game_Are_We_ 
More_Secure_?CID=28073; Bruce Schneier, Schneier: Full Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities a ‘Damned 
Good Idea,’ CSO ONLINE (Jan. 9, 2007), http://www.csoonline.com/article/216205/schneier-full-disclosure-of-
security-vulnerabilities-a-damned-good-idea-. 
 254 See, e.g., John Leyden, ImageShack Hacked in Oddball Security Protest, REGISTER (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/07/13/imageshack_hack (describing defacement of ImageShack site by 
Anti-Sec, a group protesting full disclosure). 
 255 See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SHEPHERD, SANS INST., VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE: HOW DO WE DEFINE 
RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE? (2003), available at http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/threats/ 
how_do_we_define_responsible_disclosure_932?show=932.php&cat=threats; Chris Evans et al., Rebooting 
Responsible Disclosure: A Focus on Protecting End Users, GOOGLE ONLINE SECURITY BLOG (July 20, 2010, 
2:07 PM), http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2010/07/rebooting-responsible-disclosure-focus.html; 
Vulnerability Disclosure Publications and Discussion Tracking, OULU UNIV. SECURE PROGRAMMING GRP., 
https://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/Disclosure_tracking (last visited May 13, 2011) (tracking debate).  
However, Google has recently shifted its stance, albeit slightly, focusing on reasonable disclosure deadlines 
rather than responsible disclosure.  See Google Security and Product Safety, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
corporate/security.html (last visited May 13, 2011). 
 256 See, e.g., Steve Christey & Chris Wysopal, Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure Process (Feb. 2002) 
(unpublished internet draft), http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/txt/ietf-draft.txt. 
 257 But see Brad Spengler, Hyenas of the Security Industry, SECLISTS.ORG (June 18, 2010, 1:19 AM), 
http://seclists.org/dailydave/2010/q2/58 (criticizing responsible disclosure and vendor lag in patching bugs). 
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1. Tell the Vendor First 
The first conduct-based rule would require a researcher who discovers a 
security vulnerability to report it to the vendor of the affected software before 
publishing any information about the flaw.  Failure to report before disclosing 
information about the bug would bar the researcher from availing herself of the 
safe harbor, but should not function as evidence of infringement or any other 
legal liability.  Hackers should tell the software producer—the party best 
positioned to remedy the flaw—first. 
The reporting requirement includes two additional components.  The first 
would mandate that researchers use the method of contact described on the 
home page of a vendor’s site; if the vendor fails to include a contact 
mechanism on their site, the researcher may simply notify customer support or 
the firm’s general counsel.258  Bugs submitted to tech support or to a 
company’s lawyer are less likely to receive attention, which is why this 
approach seeks to press vendors to establish a means of gathering vulnerability 
data.  Companies would likely opt to create such mechanisms because failure 
to do so would let researchers potentially avail themselves of the safe harbor 
merely by contacting technical support.  Support representatives may not be 
trained to deal properly with security reports, and hence firms would lose legal 
recourse without much corresponding benefit.  Researchers would use the 
designated contact path because immunity depends upon it.  Moreover, hackers 
want bugs to be taken seriously, and sending findings into proper channels 
increases the likelihood that that will occur.  A contact system modeled on the 
designated agent to receive notifications of claimed copyright infringement 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act would be optimal.259  The DMCA 
confers immunity upon online service providers who make available on their 
websites contact information for this agent; copyright owners are increasingly 
accustomed to looking on a service provider’s home page for contact details.260  
The contact mechanism would reduce search and communication costs for 
both parties. 
The second component would mandate a postreporting delay before the 
researcher could share vulnerability data publicly.  This would provide time for 
 
 258 See, e.g., Bug Reporting, APPLE DEVELOPER, http://developer.apple.com/bugreporter (last visited May 
13, 2011); Report a Microsoft Product Bug, MICROSOFT SUPPORT, http://support.microsoft.com/gp/contactbug 
(last updated July 30, 2009). 
 259 See Service Provider Agents, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/onlinesp/list/a_ 
agents.html (last visited May 13, 2011). 
 260 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2006). 
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the vendor to assess the new information, contact the researcher, and begin 
work upon a patch if necessary.261  Public disclosure before this period would 
negate the safe harbor.  After the initial waiting period passes, the researcher 
would be free to share the vulnerability data.262  Researchers interested in 
blackmail are unlikely to follow the safe harbor’s rules in any case, and public 
disclosure is an important incentive to compel vendors to take bugs seriously.  
Trusted intermediaries, such as the Computer Emergency Response Team 
Communication Center (CERT/CC), disclose vulnerabilities publicly forty-five 
days after they are initially reported, regardless of the status of patches from 
vendors.263  The term of the delay period must balance providing vendors with 
sufficient time to patch, against the risk to users from unpatched vulnerabilities 
and the need to press software manufacturers to act promptly.  This is 
ultimately an empirical question, but we believe the CERT/CC forty-five-day 
model is a useful starting point—particularly since vendors and the security 
community are already accustomed to it. 
2. Do Not Sell the Bug 
The second behavior rule would ban sales of vulnerability data to third 
parties.  Researchers would forfeit the safe harbor if there were sufficient 
credible evidence that they offered data about the vulnerability to any third 
party for compensation.  (This would permit transactions with the vendor.)  By 
“sufficient credible evidence,” we mean concrete facts, and not conclusory 
allegations or statements on information and belief by vendors.  To defeat 
immunity based on this factor, a software provider would have to adduce and 
support facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.264  While this might 
seem to impair programs such as Tipping Point’s Zero Day Initiative, where 
independent firms pay researchers for reporting security bugs to them, this 
concern is readily mitigated via private law.265  If participating in third-party 
“bounty hunter” programs makes a researcher ineligible for the public law safe 
harbor, researchers will either demand that their agreements with these 
 
 261 See generally Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, MICROSOFT SECURITY RESPONSE CENTER, 
http://www.microsoft.com/security/msrc/report/disclosure.aspx (last visited May 13, 2011). 
 262 See generally VIEGA, supra note 38, at 153–62. 
 263 CERT/CC Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, http://www.cert. 
org/kb/vul_disclosure.html (last updated May 15, 2008). 
 264 The weight of evidence required to overcome a motion to dismiss is unclear after the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007).  We do not believe that these shifts in the standard will have a material effect on the safe harbor. 
 265 See ZERO DAY INITIATIVE, http://www.zerodayinitiative.com (last visited May 13, 2011). 
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programs indemnify them against legal risks from IP suits, thus effectively 
reproducing the immunity, or the price that they require for reporting bugs will 
increase to compensate them for the risk.266  The goal of this factor is to 
discourage researchers from engaging in strategic behavior by marketing their 
wares to the underground before, or concurrently with, offering them to 
vendors.  While proof of efforts to sell vulnerability data may be difficult to 
obtain, we believe that the existence of this factor will help to discourage gray 
hat hackers—those willing to act as black hats or white hats depending on 
circumstances—from selling their findings to anyone other than the vendor. 
3. Test on Your Own System 
Third, researchers must test for vulnerabilities on their own systems unless 
they cannot reasonably do so, as with cloud computing.  A researcher would 
lose the safe harbor on a showing of sufficient credible evidence that she 
tested, or employed the flaw to compromise security on, a system not under her 
lawful control, unless there was no reasonable alternative.  This factor is 
intended to push researchers to investigate vulnerabilities on test systems 
rather than on production code that is in use by others.267  Analysis of whether 
there is a reasonable alternative should be searching; hackers should not 
interfere with others’ systems lightly.  For example, if a software company 
employs only open source code,268 or makes trial versions of its products 
available,269 a researcher would have ready access to the relevant code.  Hence, 
the researcher would have to test on her own system to stay within the safe 
harbor. 
However, the rise of web services and cloud computing complicates this 
analysis.  In cases where the software is available only from third-party 
systems, such as with Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2),270 researchers 
should be permitted to test vulnerabilities hosted on those systems as long as 
the researcher does not use the system to do more than verify the existence and 
extent of the vulnerability, and does not cause more than temporary, minor 
 
 266 Cf. Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
313, 351 n.165 (1990) (discussing ex ante risk compensation in tort). 
 267 See, e.g., Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon. 
com/ec2 (last visited May 13, 2011); Virtualization Security Tops RSA 2010 Innovation Sandbox, WIKIBON 
BLOG (Mar. 2, 2010), http://wikibon.org/blog/virtualization-security-tops-rsa-2010-innovation-sandbox. 
 268 See, e.g., Chromium, GOOGLE CODE, http://code.google.com/chromium (last visited May 13, 2011). 
 269 See, e.g., Free Trial Software, MCAFEE, http://home.mcafee.com/Store/FreeTrial.aspx (last visited 
May 13, 2011).  This might also helpfully push vendors to make versions available for testing. 
 270 Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), supra note 267. 
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disruption to the operation of the service.  While this qualification makes this 
third factor closer to a standard than a rule for cloud computing, it is necessary 
to enable research on “software as a service” applications and to protect 
researchers against claims that their testing harmed or impeded the service.271 
4. Do Not Weaponize 
Fourth, the researcher must not publish, without the vendor’s authorization, 
exploit- or proof-of-concept code that enables attacks against the vulnerability.  
Researchers who “weaponize” vulnerabilities increase the number of potential 
attackers.  Descriptions of security flaws may allow sophisticated black hats to 
create programs that leverage bugs, but tools that automatically attack 
weaknesses allow any user who downloads them to wreak havoc.272  While 
exploit code may alert system administrators to methods of protecting against 
vulnerabilities, the risk of attacks from “script kiddies” outweighs the gain in 
safety.273  If a vendor can show sufficient credible evidence that the researcher 
has published weaponized code, the researcher would forfeit immunity. 
5. Create a Trail 
Finally, the researcher must create an audit trail for the vulnerability by 
reporting it to the clearinghouse described below in section D.  To qualify for 
the safe harbor, the discoverer of a bug must upload a detailed description of 
the flaw, information on how to reproduce it, any known exploits or proof-of-
concept code, her identifying information, and a copy of any correspondence 
(such as e-mail) with the vendor.  This provides proof that a researcher found 
and elucidated a bug, and that she provided the vendor with sufficient 
information to investigate it.  Moreover, mandating that researchers supply 
contact information enables vendors to communicate with them, and also 
deters strategic behavior, such as claiming credit for others’ discoveries. 
The safe harbor for researchers who follow these five rules should be 
structured as an exemption from liability and not merely as a defense.  The 
 
 271 See Christina Torode, Cost-Effective Web Application Security Testing Options Take SaaS Form, 
SEARCHCIO-MIDMARKET.COM (Dec. 17, 2009), http://searchcio-midmarket.techtarget.com/tip/ 
0,289483,sid183_gci1377140,00.html.  On standards versus rules in security, see Derek E. Bambauer, Rules, 
Standards, and Geeks, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 49 (2010). 
 272 See Courtlend Little, Weaponization Trumps Skill, SC MAG. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www. 
scmagazineus.com/weaponization-trumps-skill/article/115432. 
 273 See generally Andy Greenberg, The No-Tech Hacker, FORBES.COM (Feb. 29, 2008, 6:00 AM), http:// 
www.forbes.com/2008/02/28/long-hacker-csc-tech-security-cx_ag_0229hacker.html. 
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difference between an exemption and a defense can be seen by comparing 
copyright’s fair use defense to the exemption from liability for third-party 
speech under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act.274  Fair use’s burden 
falls upon the defendant; the plaintiff need not prove that the alleged 
infringement was unfair.275  By contrast, a plaintiff alleging, for example, that 
a website is responsible for comments posted by third-party users must show 
that the site falls outside the exemption from liability created by § 230.276  An 
exemption is preferable for three reasons.  First, the safe harbor is most 
relevant, and important, in the initial stages of a dispute between a researcher 
and a vendor.  Few IP lawsuits against hackers go to trial.  Mike Lynn settled 
with Cisco,277 as Griffith and Hoffman did with Blackboard.278  The goal of a 
suit is not to win in court, but to prevent publication or use of vulnerability 
data by the researcher, to gain time for the vendor to respond to the bug (both 
in creating patches and in managing public perception of its product), and to 
force the researcher to agree to terms favorable to the company in settling the 
dispute.  The first stage of the fight is typically a request for a temporary 
restraining order or preliminary injunction that constrains the hacker’s options 
and conduct.279  Often, requests for such an order are handled ex parte, as with 
Mike Lynn and Billy Hoffman.  Thus, whether the researcher has an applicable 
defense is irrelevant, unless it is sufficiently strong to affect the judge’s 
perception of whether the plaintiff will succeed on the merits of its claim.280  
(This is unlikely, given that the vendor controls what evidence and arguments 
are adduced in the initial hearing.)  Once the vendor has the order, the 
researcher must move to change the status quo. 
Second, structuring the safe harbor as a defense would likely not reduce the 
costs researchers face sufficiently.  Hackers would have to muster evidence 
 
 274 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 275 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) (“It [was] uncontested here 
that [defendant’s] song would be an infringement of [plaintiff’s] rights in [the copyrighted work] under the 
Copyright Act of 1976, but for a finding of fair use . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 276 See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding no liability).  But see Fair 
Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162–63, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding liability 
where site’s design made it partially responsible for content). 
 277 Brian Krebs, Text of the Cisco-ISS-Lynn-Black Hat Agreement, WASH. POST SECURITY FIX (July 29, 
2005, 12:35 PM), http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2005/07/text_of_the_ciscoisslynnblack.html. 
 278 Blackboard Reaches Settlement with Hacker Duo, RFIDNEWS (July 16, 2003), http://www.rfidnews. 
org/2003/07/16/blackboard-reaches-settlement-with-hacker-duo. 
 279 See, e.g., Verified Complaint, supra note 157. 
 280 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008) (citing standard for 
preliminary injunction). 
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and legal arguments to support their eligibility for the exemption.281  Even 
hiring counsel can be an expensive proposition for individual researchers. 
Finally, altering the allocation of the burden of proof is important to this 
Article’s larger normative goals.  Given its social utility, security research 
should be presumptively legitimate, not unlawful.  It should be incumbent 
upon an aggrieved vendor to overcome this presumption of legality, not for 
researchers to validate their activities. 
Thus, the legal reform component of the Hacker’s Aegis would establish 
exemption from IP-based liability for researchers who follow five rules: alert 
the vendor first; do not offer to sell data to any third party; refrain from testing 
systems not under their control unless there is no reasonable alternative; do not 
weaponize code; and create an audit trail.  To break through this exemption, 
vendors would have to show facts that demonstrate that the researcher has 
violated one of these five requirements. 
B. Form for Substance 
Legal reform to shield security researchers from the threat of IP litigation 
by vendors could follow one of two paths.  The first initiates new legislation to 
exempt research from liability.  The second adapts existing doctrinal defenses 
in IP to cover researchers’ activities.  Each approach confers benefits, and 
faces challenges.  Overall, we believe research-specific legislation is the 
preferable path. 
A statute conferring immunity upon a designated class of actors—security 
researchers—has several advantages.282  First, legislation could tailor the 
exemption to reward helpful behavior while leaving malefactors at risk of 
liability.  Second, actor-specific rules could eliminate strategic behavior by 
vendors and others alleging infringement.  If protections for researchers varied 
by IP doctrine, aggrieved software companies would seek to frame their claims 
under the theory with the narrowest protection.283  This is particularly 
applicable for software, which can be protected under multiple, overlapping IP 
regimes.  Third, it likely operates more rapidly than an accretion of doctrine-
 
 281 Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (“Since fair use is an affirmative 
defense [to a claim of copyright infringement], its proponent would have difficulty carrying the burden of 
demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 282 See generally Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908). 
 283 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 183 (adducing multiple IP theories for liability); Verified Complaint, 
supra note 157. 
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specific exemptions developed from individual cases.  A specific law that 
operated uniformly across IP doctrines and across jurisdictions would provide 
a more complete and more rapid shield than case-by-case development. 
However, employing a statute specific to vulnerability research also has 
weaknesses.  Most importantly, public choice problems make it likely that such 
a law would be underprotective.284  Owners of intellectual property in software 
are concentrated and relatively powerful.285  They have strong financial 
incentives to maximize IP protection for their code and would likely oppose, or 
seek to weaken, a research exemption.  Other powerful interests—for example, 
those whose content is protected by code, such as the movie industry—would 
likely side with vendors.286  By contrast, independent researchers tend to be 
individuals or small firms with less political sophistication and fewer 
resources.  The situation is analogous to the ecosystem of interests involved in 
crafting copyright legislation described by Jessica Litman: content owners are 
politically sophisticated, resourceful, and have significant stakes in the 
outcome, while users and public interests are weaker, dispersed, and lack an 
effective representative.287  A law protecting vulnerability research might 
appear (if at all) like the exemptions under the DMCA for security research, 
encryption research, and reverse engineering, which are so narrow that they 
have only been advanced in five cases since 1998, and never successfully.288  
Moreover, weak protection might be worse for researchers than none at all, as 
it would be difficult to argue that their actions should be protected if they fell 
outside the scope of legislatively determined permissible behavior. 
The other option—employing doctrine-specific exceptions to protect 
security research—also confers benefits.  It has the standard virtues of 
common law adjudication: judges can adapt protections to fit different 
circumstances, and variation among courts permits helpful experimentation in 
 
 284 See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 403–04, 416. 
 285 See generally William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership 
of Ideas in the United States, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 72, 82–84 (David Vaver ed., 2006). 
 286 See, e.g., Content Protection, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., http://www.mpaa.org/contentprotection 
(last visited May 13, 2011). 
 287 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001). 
 288 The reverse engineering exemption, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f), was held inapplicable in three cases: 
Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005); Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. 
Divineo, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).  It was 
treated favorably in dicta in one case, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 
522 (6th Cir. 2004).  The encryption research exemption was held inapplicable in Reimerdes. 
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the scope of protection.289  Exceptions such as fair use in copyright law have a 
rich precedential history that could guide judges in tailoring protection 
appropriately.290 
Doctrine-specific rules also suffer drawbacks, though.  First, protection for 
software research would need to measure eligibility in a purposive fashion 
rather than based on formal characteristics or descriptions of activity.  Black 
hat and white hat hackers perform the same type of research; until they 
disseminate their findings, only their goals differ.291  If it is not clear what a 
researcher plans to do with vulnerability information, a court may be risk-
averse and block dissemination.292  Second, judges—especially those 
unfamiliar with computer technology—may be skeptical of the value of 
independent security research (rather than that conducted by a vendor), and 
will likely suffer from information asymmetry, particularly when confronted 
with ex parte requests for temporary injunctive relief.  A vendor’s portrayal of 
the risks from a rogue teenage hacker may swamp calculations of the greater 
public interest in salience.293  Finally, vendors would likely engage in strategic 
behavior.  Many complaints against researchers allege multiple violations from 
different IP doctrines: Mike Lynn faced claims for copyright infringement and 
misappropriation of trade secrets; Billy Hoffman and Virgil Griffith were 
accused of trade secret and trademark violations.294  If protections for security 
research varied by doctrine, software firms would simply recast their claims 
against hackers in the relevant theory with the least protection.  A shield with 
holes is nearly as ineffective as no shield at all. 
Overall, a statute specifically protecting software security research 
comports best with this Article’s goals.  It would focus on the activity to be 
protected, and not on the form in which a vendor’s threat appears.  Similarly, a 
shield law would protect researchers across jurisdictions, as well as across 
areas of IP.  Lastly, a specific statute may be cost saving: it guides courts on 
 
 289 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); ROSCOE 
POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921). 
 290 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
 291 See Bryan Smith et al., Ethical Hacking: The Security Justification, in ETHICS AND ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION 148 (Barbara Rockenbach & Tom Mendina eds., 2003). 
 292 Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 193, 199–203 (1991). 
 293 See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications, and the 
Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 692–94 (2006); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 65, at 24–26, 33–34. 
 294 Verified Complaint, supra note 157, at 6–7. 
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how to evaluate researchers’ actions, and notifies researchers about how to 
avoid liability.  While a shield law faces political challenges, we prefer it as a 
more effective solution. 
C. Changing the Hacker Image 
It’s so easy to impress judges with heavily connoted words like 
“virus”, “pirate”, “terrorist”, “hacker”, and it’s so difficult on the 
other hand to explain the scientific method and the deep curiosity 
that makes us analyze how software works and find their flaws.295 
The term hacker is a loaded one.  It connotes not only technical skill, but 
also a disregard for rules and, at times, a malicious enjoyment in finding flaws 
and wreaking havoc.296  Researchers like being seen as outlaws rather than 
nerds.  However, these normative associations have real drawbacks along with 
psychological benefits.297  Judges, journalists, and the general public may 
perceive a “hacker” as inherently threatening, and react accordingly.298  We 
propose that the research community attempt to mitigate this semantic 
problem. 
Hackers suffer an inherent disadvantage in how others are likely to 
perceive their work, in three ways.  First, an aggrieved software vendor 
possesses first-mover advantage: the firm is generally the party that frames the 
dispute for a court by filing a complaint or a request for temporary injunctive 
relief, which often occurs ex parte.  Second, plaintiffs may mix allegations of 
criminal liability with IP claims, portraying the hackers as vandals or 
thieves.299  Finally, intellectual property itself is a normatively loaded term that 
confers an advantage on software providers: researchers are seen as meddling, 
interfering with, or damaging someone else’s valuable possession.300 
While the first two of these challenges are hard to remedy, researchers can 
shift the rhetorical debate surrounding their use of others’ IP.  Even real 
 
 295 Rik Lambers, Guillermito: Reverse Engineering & Scientific Research, COCO (Jan. 11, 2005), 
http://constitutionalcode.blogspot.com/2005/01/guillermito-reverse-engineering.html (quoting Guillame 
Tena’s discussion of his trial for copyright infringement in France for publishing research on flaws in Tegam’s 
Viguard antivirus software; Tegam labeled Tena a “terrorist”). 
 296 See GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 51. 
 297 See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (describing the 
power of linguistic framing to affect cognitive perception). 
 298 See DOUGLAS THOMAS, HACKER CULTURE 5 (2002) (“This is the common perception of today’s 
hacker—a wily computer criminal . . . .”). 
 299 See, e.g., supra notes 163, 202, 213, and accompanying text. 
 300 See Fisher, supra note 285, at 84–86. 
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property doctrine permits unauthorized use when there is a compelling 
reason,301 such as: necessity302 or emergency,303 countervailing social need 
(such as access to social services),304 or even customary practice.305  And 
intellectual property is most commonly viewed in the United States as a 
utilitarian bargain between creators and the public, where the state confers 
limited monopoly rights to attain social benefits, such as information 
production and distribution.306  Those rights are circumscribed by exceptions, 
such as the nominative use doctrine307 or privileges for socially beneficial 
actors, such as public libraries,308 that safeguard valuable though 
nonpermissive uses.309  Researchers should therefore emphasize not the 
potential harm to software companies from vulnerabilities, but the benefits to 
consumers from fixing those bugs (or, put another way, the risks to consumers 
if a vendor fails to do so).  Property law operates most strongly to limit 
owners’ rights when there are significant externalities involved.  Software is a 
canonical example.  To use a real property analogy: researchers should 
emphasize the interests of the tenants (users) to counteract the claims of the 
owners.  By portraying their work as aligned with users’ needs, hackers can 
mitigate the power of the property analogy employed by software vendors. 
Shifting perceptions is difficult.  If security researchers want to alter their 
public image, two strategies are possible.  First, they could seek to reclaim the 
term hacker.  Initially, a hacker was someone who probed or modified 
hardware or software to see how it worked, and perhaps to change its 
function.310  However, the term increasingly connotes one whose activities are 
illegal, and perhaps malicious (though discerning researchers refer to the latter 
as “crackers”).311  To return hacker to its lexical roots requires three things, in 
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ascending order of difficulty: finding a new term for those who invade systems 
or crack software with ill intent; convincing the security research community 
to adopt the new term and employ it with some consistency; and convincing 
others (particularly the media) to follow the new usage pattern.  Alternative 
terms, such as cracker, are readily available.  However, the research 
community seems unwilling to shift usage—in part because some like the 
outlaw image that hacker currently provides.  Even if vulnerability researchers 
take up new terms, it is not clear that such a change will spread to the wider 
public, particularly since hacker is evocative. 
The second option is for legitimate researchers to abandon hacker to the 
black hats.  One way to do this would be to embed the term hacker in federal 
criminal law, such as by defining it in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.312  
This would formalize the equivalence between hackers and black hats.  
Legitimate researchers would employ a new term to describe those who 
conform to laws and norms governing software security, and would insist (to 
the degree they are able) that others refer to them by that moniker.  While the 
adoption challenges described above remain, a new term will lack the 
cognitive inertia that hacker possesses, which may mitigate these issues.  
Moreover, researchers can seek to shift the analogy that dominates 
vulnerability analysis.  If they portray their role as similar to whistleblowers,313 
independent testing companies such as Consumers Union,314 or watchdogs 
such as the Center for Science in the Public Interest,315 their work is more 
likely to be treated as legitimate.  The term needs to be pithy, appealing, and 
different from hacker; we offer bug hunter, cyber-watchdog, and security 
researcher as possibilities, but hope others will introduce more catchy 
options.316  This shift in perception—drawing a distinct rhetorical line between 
white hat and black hat researchers—will benefit researchers.  As researchers’ 
 
 312 We thank Scott Velez for this insight. 
 313 See, e.g., JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE 3 (1998) (describing role of 
Frederic Whitehurst in revealing wrongdoing at the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s crime laboratory). 
 314 See, e.g., Cutting Surgical Infections, SAFE PATIENT PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2009), http://www. 
safepatientproject.org/cutting_surgical_infection.pdf (documenting hospitals’ rates of infections during 
surgery). 
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action to stop Bayer Healthcare’s false advertising). 
 316 We recognize our lack of skill in developing pithy terminology, and thank Shubha Ghosh (paladins), 
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Guido informed us that some researchers have adopted the term busticati for this purpose. 
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work appears less threatening, legal measures to restrict its production and 
dissemination will appear less necessary. 
D. Freeing Markets 
The market for information about software vulnerabilities is not a well-
working one due to high transaction costs, information asymmetry, the risks of 
strategic behavior, and time pressure.  We propose two changes that will 
ameliorate these issues. 
Both researchers and vendors are reluctant participants in transactions 
involving vulnerability data, in part because of transaction costs.  A hacker 
who discovers a flaw must determine which party to attempt to do business 
with (for example, deciding between the vendor, the vendor’s customers, or 
security consulting firms) and then who to contact (for example, a 
development team, legal counsel, or management).  For their part, vendors 
must separate legitimate inquiries from attempts at fraud or blackmail.  They 
also must assess whether a vulnerability is a known problem, whether the 
researcher or others have working code to exploit it, and whether the seller is 
sufficiently trustworthy to enter into a transaction. 
Even once a willing seller locates, and communicates with, a willing buyer, 
the parties will have difficulty coming to terms due to information 
asymmetry.317  There is no price list, or set of criteria, to determine what a bug 
is worth.318  Unsurprisingly, vendors tend to value vulnerability information 
less than researchers do.  The market for security flaws is an illiquid one, since 
transactions are sporadic and often secret.319  The lack of reference data for 
pricing means that vendors and researchers may fail to strike deals that would 
benefit both parties, since they may err (or simply differ) in assessing the 
data’s value.  Moreover, reducing information asymmetry through sharing is 
challenging.320  For sellers, presenting their wares to software companies is 
chancy, not merely because doing so may put them at legal risk, but because 
 
 317 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE 
AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 616 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Special Conference Ser. 
13, 1962). 
 318 See Greenberg, supra note 101 (describing a researcher’s difficulty in valuing a server vulnerability, 
even with a willing buyer). 
 319 See generally Karthik Kannan & Rahul Telang, Market for Software Vulnerabilities?  Think Again, 51 
MGMT. SCI. 726 (2005) (describing the inefficiencies of a market-based vulnerability-disclosure system). 
 320 See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair 
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 267 (1987). 
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sharing findings could destroy their value.  This results from Arrow’s paradox: 
it is hard to demonstrate the value of a security flaw without revealing 
information sufficient to permit the vendor to remedy it.321 
Finally, the risk of strategic behavior weakens prospects for a successful 
bargain.  Researchers worry about misappropriation.  Arrow’s paradox 
presents a hard choice: disclose too little, and vendors may not believe the 
problem is real; disclose too much, and a software company may take the 
information without compensation.  Vendors, in turn, have trouble 
guaranteeing that a researcher who shares data with them is not also sharing it 
on the black market.  Paying hackers for bugs may also tempt researchers to 
target a company’s software.  Fears about the other party’s behavior effectively 
decrease the value of a deal for both sides (due to increased risk that the 
bargain will unravel) and may lead to additional costs from preventive 
measures. 
Lastly, time pressures shrink the window for vendors and researchers to 
reach an agreement.  Hackers correctly perceive that their vulnerability 
information has a limited viable lifetime.322  Other researchers may discover 
the same weakness and either launch an attack or offer a competing bargain.  
The vendor may change its code, deliberately or inadvertently remedying the 
problem.  If the hacker has revealed any information to the software company, 
the firm may be able to reverse engineer the vulnerability from that limited 
data, making the research worthless.  Firms, too, face time constraints.  If one 
person has found a weakness in their code, others are likely to do so as well.  A 
researcher frustrated by the pace of negotiations may turn to the black market.  
Finally, vendors require lead time to write, compile, test, and distribute 
patches.  To address a bug, a vendor needs as much time as possible to 
generate a fix and to get customers to install it. 
There are significant structural barriers to market transactions between 
information suppliers (researchers) and consumers (vendors).  To reduce these 
impediments, we propose that a trusted third party act as a voluntary 
coordinator or clearinghouse for vulnerability deals.  We envision this 
intermediary playing three roles.  First, it would archive and validate 
vulnerability data for researchers.  This would allow a hacker to claim credit 
 
 321 Arrow, supra note 317, at 616. 
 322 Stefan Frei et al., Modelling the Security Ecosystem—The Dynamics of (In)Security, 8 WORKSHOP ON 
ECON. INFO. SECURITY 3–7 (2009), available at http://www.techzoom.net/papers/weis_security_ecosystem_ 
2009.pdf. 
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for discovering a bug, and to store diagnostic data and any exploit code.  
Registries with trusted third parties have been used successfully to overcome 
the challenges of Arrow’s paradox in other contexts, such as unsolicited 
manuscripts for television shows and movies.323  Second, it would maintain 
contact information for vendors and researchers.  The third party might offer 
anonymous referrals, where the identity of a hacker or vendor is known to the 
coordinator but not to the other party.  This could encourage researchers who 
are risk-averse to share discoveries through legitimate channels.  Finally, the 
trusted third party could play a reputational role.  It could make available data 
about previous reports and transactions, perhaps in summary form, to help 
vendors and researchers establish trustworthiness.324  A more interventionist 
role might have the intermediary act as a third-party beneficiary to a 
nondisclosure agreement between a seller and buyer, allowing the coordinator 
to enforce bargains and to police adherence through both legal means and 
reputational sanctions (such as disclosing violations publicly). 
Existing security organizations, such as Computer Emergency Response 
Team’s Coordination Center (CERT/CC) at Carnegie Mellon University’s 
Software Engineering Institute, are well positioned to act as clearinghouses.325  
CERT/CC has a strong reputation in the computer security field and acts as a 
key channel of information distribution about vulnerabilities.  CERT 
Coordination Center partners with both private- and public-sector entities in 
the field, and its Knowledgebase already contains data on thousands of 
reported vulnerabilities.326  Other entities, such as the Internet Storm Center,327 
MITRE,328 and perhaps even government-sponsored organizations such as the 
National Vulnerability Database,329 might also act as intermediaries.  The 
critical issue for the coordinating entity is credibility: it must be trusted, both 
 
 323 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1366–68 (1996) (describing script registry operated by Writer’s 
Guild of America); WGAWREGISTRY.ORG, http://www.wgawregistry.org/webrss (last visited May 13, 2011). 
 324 Cf. Jonathan Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 93–97 (describing reputation rating 
systems). 
 325 CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC), COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, http://www.cert. 
org/certcc.html (last visited May 13, 2011). 
 326 CERT Knowledgebase, COMPUTER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM, http://www.cert.org/kb (last updated 
Apr. 18, 2008). 
 327 About the Internet Storm Center, SANS INTERNET STORM CTR., http://isc.sans.org/about.html (last 
visited May 13, 2011). 
 328 COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION, http://cwe.mitre.org (last updated May 11, 2011). 
 329 NAT’L VULNERABILITY DATABASE, http://nvd.nist.gov (last updated May 13, 2011). 
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by vendors and by researchers.330  To this end, it might be necessary to insulate 
the intermediary itself from liability based on holding bug data or interacting 
with its constituents.  The clearinghouse could likely achieve immunity 
through private bargains—vendors and researchers could be required to waive 
claims against it as a condition of participation—but if necessary, the “shield 
law” discussed above should include such protections. 
A benefit of this approach is that both vendors and researchers would likely 
utilize a trusted third party system voluntarily, because it reduces their costs 
and risks.  For example, the combination of the registry and the reputational 
metadata would help vendors decide which researchers are worth the cost of 
entering into a nondisclosure agreement to further inspect a claimed 
vulnerability.  This increases the likelihood that this part of the Hacker’s Aegis 
would be adopted, and used. 
Use of a voluntary coordinating intermediary would help reduce costs that 
researchers and vendors alike face in exchanging information about 
vulnerabilities, making legitimate transactions easier and more likely. 
E. Challenges 
There are at least two potential challenges that our proposed reforms might 
confront.  The first is that our legal reforms might be underinclusive.  The 
second is the risk of strategic behavior based on the legal safe harbor we 
propose.  In this section, we address each issue. 
Our legal proposal contemplates a shield from civil liability under 
intellectual property claims or causes of action.  However, it does not 
encompass other theories of liability—in particular, tort claims, civil claims 
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and criminal prosecution.  We have 
four reasons for crafting the safe harbor to leave these legal tools available.  
First, in analyzing legal threats against security researchers, IP claims 
predominate.  We view establishing a shield against them as a first step, but 
not necessarily a final one.  If software companies shift to using alternative 
theories such as tort and CFAA claims, with similar chilling effects, we would 
advocate expanding the safe harbor to exclude such theories. 
 
 330 This could weigh against a government entity acting as intermediary, as security researchers may be 
reluctant to reveal information to a sovereign with the power to prosecute them. 
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Second, tort claims are typically weaker than IP ones.  Common law 
doctrines such as trespass to chattels have largely been displaced by software- 
and internet-specific statutes.331  Successful suits under trespass to chattels are 
relatively rare, and the theory has been questioned by leading courts such as 
the California Supreme Court.332  Other tort claims, such as tortious 
interference with business expectations or prospective economic advantage, 
typically recapitulate IP claims in slightly different form.333  In addition, proof 
of actual damage is required for tort claims, such as interference with 
prospective advantage, and injunctive relief is atypical.334  These factors 
reduce the risk from tort theories to software researchers. 
Third, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act contains a built-in limitation on 
civil liability that offers protection to security researchers.  To maintain a cause 
of action under the CFAA, a plaintiff must demonstrate economic damages of 
at least $5,000 in a one-year period, impairment of a person’s medical 
treatment, physical injury to a person, threat to public health or safety, or 
damage to a U.S. government computer.335  A researcher testing software on a 
computer under her control is unlikely to contravene any of these limits, 
reducing the threat of the CFAA. 
Finally, our proposed changes leave security researchers vulnerable to 
criminal charges, under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and other 
statutes.336  This is deliberate.  We believe that criminal sanctions are 
necessary to deter strategic behavior by black hat hackers, who may try to fit 
their activities within the contours of the safe harbor.337  Criminal law acts to 
reinforce any gaps within the liability shield.338  If a hacker’s activity, though 
 
 331 Compare CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (issuing 
injunction against spammer based on trespass to chattels theory), with Facebook, Inc. v. Guerbuez, No. C08-
03889-JF-HRL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108921 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2008) (issuing judgment in similar case 
against spammer based on CAN-SPAM statute). 
 332 See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). 
 333 See, e.g., Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 323–24 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding claim preclusion of 
trademark claim based on prior decision regarding interference with contractual relations). 
 334 See, e.g., Durasys, Inc. v. Leyba, 992 F.2d 1465 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 335 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
 336 See, e.g., id. §§ 1030, 2511. 
 337 But see, e.g., Mark Rasch, German Hacker-Tool Law Snares . . . No-One, REGISTER (June 7, 2009, 
08:02 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/06/07/germany_hacker_tool_law (arguing German cybercrime 
law resulted in security companies leaving that country, despite lack of prosecutions under it). 
 338 Cf. Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295 (2008) 
(analyzing the effectiveness of neoclassical and alternative deterrence theories in the context of criminal, 
corporate anti-fraud laws—an area in which perpetrators’ conduct is more likely to be discovered if they 
discontinue the fraud). 
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protected from civil claims, causes sufficient harm, a software company is 
likely to be able to convince a prosecutor to file charges.  The risk of 
overdeterrence from criminal law remains, but it is likely no worse than under 
current circumstances.  In addition, prosecutors are more likely to arrive at an 
objective assessment of whether a hacker’s behavior is beneficial or malicious 
than the vendor whose software has been targeted.  Thus, retaining criminal 
liability for hacking serves a helpful deterrence function, and should not create 
additional chilling effects for security researchers. 
There is one aspect of CFAA criminal liability that may give hackers pause 
and thereby create overdeterrence: the ban on damage that affects ten or more 
computers.339  This provision, adopted to deal with threats from viruses and 
worms, may be problematic when researchers probe cloud computing.  
Services such as Gmail run on multiple servers, and their storage units (such as 
storage array networks (SANs) or network-attached storage (NAS)) may 
comprise computers in their own right.340  If criminal CFAA liability interferes 
with testing of cloud-computing security, we propose two fixes.  First, the legal 
safe harbor could modify the CFAA to condition liability on accessing a larger 
number of computers—perhaps 100.  This would maintain liability for virus 
creators and distributors, but would reduce the threat to researchers.  Second—
and likely more promising—cloud-computing services should be treated as a 
single computer under the CFAA.  The appeal of cloud computing is that it 
appears to users as a single service or computer.  Moreover, the number of 
computers accessed during a cloud-computing session is under the control of 
the service provider.  This creates a risk of strategic behavior: providers could 
ensure that any transaction affected ten or more computers, creating the 
possibility that any claimed damage would generate potential criminal liability.  
However, we believe such alteration should be withheld until there is more 
evidence of harm to cloud computing security research.  As described above, 
treating cloud computing as a single computer would effectively remove part 
of the CFAA as a resource for providers, which is why we believe such a 
change should wait for more evidence of a problem. 
This Article’s proposals are a first step toward mitigating IP law’s 
unhelpful channeling effects for software security research.  Its proposed legal 
 
 339 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(VI) (2006); id. § 1030(g) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
 340 Cf. SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INTRODUCTION TO CLOUD COMPUTING ARCHITECTURE (2009), available at 
http://webobjects.cdw.com/webobjects/media/pdf/Sun_CloudComputing.pdf (discussing the transformative 
nature of cloud computing and outlining considerations that businesses should take when implementing such a 
system). 
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reforms do not alter tort theories and civil CFAA claims regarding hacking 
because their built-in doctrinal safeguards should be sufficient.  Should this 
prove incorrect, we propose revisiting the scope of the legal shield to address 
such risks.  And, our proposal retains criminal liability as a necessary deterrent 
to counter strategic behavior by malicious hackers. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that intellectual property law impedes the dissemination 
of socially valuable research into software security flaws.  By reducing the 
threat of civil IP liability for researchers, the cost of legitimate transactions, 
and the specter of harm from the term hacker, our proposed reforms would 
improve software security and decrease users’ risks. 
The paper’s conclusions have repercussions beyond software—research 
into security occurs in the physical world as well as the digital one.341  A 
graduate student in computer science created a web application that generates a 
boarding pass sufficiently realistic to deceive Transportation Security 
Administration screeners.342  For his efforts to show the ineffectiveness of 
airport security, he had his computer seized, was questioned by the FBI, and 
was denounced by a U.S. Congressman.343  Cyclists who relied on Kryptonite 
bike locks were startled when security consultant Chris Brennan showed how 
to open the locks using a plastic pen.344  Medeco locks—considered so secure 
that they are used at the White House and the Pentagon—have been hacked 
using credit cards and sharp scissors.345  Security researcher Chris Soghoian 
 
 341 Cf. Peter P. Swire, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different About Computer 
and Network Security?, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 163 (2004) (contrasting free disclosure versus 
secrecy and analyzing the ability of each to aid or diminish security in traditional contexts or in computer 
network contexts). 
 342 CHRIS’S NWA BOARDING PASS GENERATOR, http://www.dubfire.net/boarding_pass (last visited May 
13, 2011); see also Christopher Soghoian, Insecure Flight: Broken Boarding Passes and Ineffective Terrorist 
Watch Lists (July 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1001675. 
 343 Robert Lemos, FBI Raids Home of Boarding-Pass Creator, SECURITYFOCUS (Oct. 30, 2006), 
http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/342; Jonathan Silverstein, Web Site Lets Anyone Create Fake Boarding 
Passes, ABC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2006), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=2611432&page=1; Ryan 
Singel, Congressman Ed Markey Wants Security Researcher Arrested, WIRED THREAT LEVEL (Oct. 27, 2006, 
10:57 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2006/10/congressman_ed_/. 
 344 Leander Kahney, Twist a Pen, Open a Lock, WIRED (Sept. 17, 2004), http://www.wired.com/culture/ 
lifestyle/news/2004/09/64987; Filouphil, Kryptonite Bikeforum, YOUTUBE (Jan. 30, 2007), http://www. 
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published a guide to loopholes and exploits in consumer credit practices that 
enable attackers to modify their credit reports and obtain loans for which they 
could not otherwise qualify.346  “Locksporters” test every lock on the market 
with tools from custom-made hooks to beer cans.347  Each of these activities 
produces valuable information about how safe we really are, and each has been 
subject to legal threats.  It may be necessary to extend the Hacker’s Aegis to 
protect them as well.  Bug hunting may simply be one exemplar of a peer-
production activity with societal benefits that is impeded by law. 
Software security research is helpful, and intellectual property law 
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